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THE FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY 
COMMISSION AND ENVIRONMENTAL 
JUSTICE: DO THE NATIONAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT AND THE 
CLEAN AIR ACT OFFER A BETTER WAY? 
JASON PINNEV* 
Abstract: The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) has failed to 
incorporate elwironmental justice principles into its decisionmaking process. 
Accordingly, in light of FERC's questionable environmental record and 
seeming immunity from traditional environmental justice challenges, the 
potential for abuse arises when FERC decides on matters impacting poor and 
minority communities. Why hasn't FERC established a comprehensive strat-
egy to prevent environmental injustice? There is no ready answer to this 
question. But one thing is clear: FERC should not be permitted to act with 
impunity when deciding on issues affecting poor and minority communities. 
To ensure this result, agencies and activists should consider provisions of the 
National Environmental Policy Act and the Clean Air Act as a means of pro-
moting FERC's compliance with environmental justice principles. 
INTRODUCTION 
In Mount Vernon, New York, neighborhood activists, local politi-
cians, and one influential senator have banded together in opposition 
to the Millennium Project-a gas pipeline slated to run directly 
through the heart of the city.l The demand is for environmental jus-
* Executive Editor, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW, 2002-03. 
I See infra Part II.B. Following the completion of this Note, Millennium Pipeline Co. 
and the City of Mount Vernon entered into a settlement rerouting the proposed pipeline 
through a commercial district, instead of a residential district. See Millennium Pipeline Co., 
100 F.E.R.C. 1 61,27i (2002) (order issuing certificate), 2002 FERC LEXIS 1903, at *9. 
The terms of the settlement are confidential. Telephone Interview with Michael Zarin, 
Zarin & Steinmetz (jan. 22, 2003). Interestingly, although failing to discuss environmental 
justice issues, FERC approved the variation in part because it mm'ed the location of the 
pipeline "away from sensitive resources such as residential neighborhoods, apartment 
buildings, a school, health center, hospital, churches, and fire stations," M.illcnnill1n Pipeline, 
100 F,E.R.C, 1 61,277, 2002 FERC LEXIS 1903, at *24, FERC, however, still has not prom-
ulgated an environmental justice policy or agreed to incorporate such principles into their 
decision making process, 
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tice. 2 At the heart of this controversy is whether the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission (FERC or Commission), an independent 
regulatory agency with the responsibility of licensing the project,3 is 
obligated to take environmental justice concerns into account when 
making decisions affecting poor and minority communities. 
This Note suggests that the answer is yes. Part I begins with an 
overview of the environmental justice movement, from its origins 
twenty years ago to the present day. In Part II, the discussion shifts to 
the creation of FERC, its status as an independent agency, and its 
questionable environmental record. Part III examines how traditional 
environmental justice arguments might fare against FERC's actions. 
Finally, Part IV questions the Commission's reluctance to take envi-
ronmental justice into account, examines the advantages that envi-
ronmental statutes may provide, and concludes by suggesting that 
specific provisions of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) 
and the Clean Air Act (CAA) may present the best options for ensur-
ing that environmental justice becomes a factor in FERC's decision-
making process. 
I. HISTORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL]USTICE 
The concept of environmental justice is not a judicial construct.4 
It did not originate on the floors of the House of Representatives or 
2 The V.S. Environmen tal Protection Agency defines environ men tal justice as: 
[T] he fair treatment and meaningful involvement of all people regardless of 
race, color, national origin, or income with respect to the development, im-
plementation, and enforcement of environmental laws, regulations, and poli-
cies. Fair treatment means that no group of people, including a racial, ethnic, 
or socioeconomic group, should bear a disproportionate share of the nega-
tive environmental consequences resulting from industrial, municipal, and 
commercial operations or the execution of federal, state, local, and tribal 
programs and policies. 
OFFICE OF ENFORCEMENT & COMPLIANCE AsSURANCE, V.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, ENVI-
RONMENTAL JUSTICE, at http://www.epa.gov / compliance/ environmentaljustice/index. 
html (last updated Sept. 26, 2002). 
3 See discussion infra Part III.C.2. 
4 The first environmental justice arguments were made by residents of Houston, Texas 
in Bean v. Southwestern Waste Management CO/p., 482 F. Supp. 673,674-77 (S.D. Tex. 1979). 
Plaintiffs charged that the defendants had discriminated against them in the operation of 
a solid waste management facility in a predominantly minority community. [d. The judge, 
however, dismissed their novel claim for failing to prove intentional disCI'imination. [d. at 
681; see discussion infra Part IV.C.2. 
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the Senate.5 Nor did the media invent it.6 Rather, environmental jus-
tice began with the public.7 Once citizens began to examine the rela-
tionships between race, class, political power, and exposure to envi-
ronmental hazards, they began to see a pattern emerge: poor peo~ 
of color were bearing the brunt of the burden.s In response, grass-
roots activists from Maine to Alaska began to organize and demon-
strate against disproportionate environmental impacts on minority 
communities.9 These efforts culminated into a movement that has, 
over time, given a voice to those who have traditionally been under-
represented in the environmental arena. lO 
A. Origins of the Movement 
The environmental justice movement began with a collection of 
concerned citizens united in the general belief that the burdens of 
environmental pollution should not fall disproportionately on poor 
and minority communities. ll Exactly where and when the movement 
first formed is the subject of mild debate.12 Commentators commonly 
5 In both 1992 and 1993, Congress considered and rejected proposed environmental 
justice legislation. See Environmental Justice Act of 1993, H.R. 2105, 103d Congo (1993); 
Environmental Justice Act of 1992, H.R. 5326, 102d Congo (1992). The purpose of the 
legislation was "to assure nondiscriminatory compliance with all environmental, health 
and safety laws and to assure equal protection of the public health." H.R. 2105. 
6 The phrase "environmental racism," often used synonymously with environmental 
justice, is widely attributed to Dr. Benjamin Chavis, former executive director of the 
United Church of Christ Commission for Racial Justice. See Michele L. Knorr, Environ-
mental Injustice: Inequities Between Empirical Data and Federal, State Legislative and Judicial Re-
sponses, 6 U. BALT.]. ENVTL. L. 71, 72 n.9, 73 (1997); James H. Colopy, Note, The Road Less 
Traveled: Pursuing Environmental Justice Through Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, 13 STAN. 
ENVTL. LJ. 125, 129 n.7 (1994). 
7 See ROBERT D. BULURD, DUMPING IN DIXIE 118 (2d ed. 1994) (stating that the envi-
ronmentaljustice issues were brought to the forefront by academics and activists); Dorceta 
E. Taylor, Environmentalism and the Politics of Inclusion, in CONFRONTING ENVIRONMENTAL 
RACISM: VOICES FROM THE GRASSROOTS 53, 53-55 (Robert D. Bullard ed., 1993) (discuss-
ing the influx of minority participation in environmental groups). 
8 See Taylor, supra note 7, at 54. 
9 See Robert D. Bullard, Anatomy of Environmental Racism and the Environmental Justice 
Movement, in CONFRONTING ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM: VOICES FROM THE GRASSROOTS, supra 
note 7, at 24-26. 
10 See Taylor, supm note 7, at 53-54. 
11 See Robert D. Bullard, Introduction to UNEQUAL PROTECTION: ENVIRONMENTAL JUS-
TICE AND COMMUNITIES OF COLOR at i, xv-xvi (Robert D. Bullard ed., 1994). 
12 Compare Robert D. Bullard, Environmental Justice for Al~ in UNEQUAL PROTECTION: 
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE AND COMMUNITIES OF COLOR, supm note 11, at 3-5 (linking a 
1967 student revolt at Texas Southern University with environmental justice), with Daniel 
Faber, The Struggle for Ecological Democmcy and Environmental Justice, in THE STRUGGLE FOR 
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refer to one key event, however, when discussing the rise of the envi-
ronmentaljustice movement: the Warren County protests,l3 
In 1982, the Governor of North Carolina selected Warren County 
to be the dumping grounds for more than 6000 truckloads of soil 
contaminated with polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs).14 PCBs are ex-
tremely toxic industrial by-products, which have been linked with 
liver, blood, nerve, and reproductive disorders. 15lThe Warren County 
site was officially chosen because it presented a bcure landfill,16 but 
later studies revealed that the site was not suitable because of its prox-
imity to the water table.l1~ 
Suspicions arose that North Carolina had not secured the safest 
place to store the waste, but rather, had chosen the path of least po-
litical resistance.l8 At the time of the decision, Warren was the poorest 
county in the state, and the population was over 65% black.19 Before 
long, these suspicions developed into feelings of victimization, and, in 
response, residents began to form a movement in opposition to the 
landfill. 2o This movement attracted the attention of national civil 
rights and environmental leaders who joined with the residents in an 
effort to block the selection of the site.21 
Massive protests ensued, resulting in over 500 arrests.22 Although 
the demonstrations did not stop the state from siting the landfill in 
Warren County, protestors were successful in forcing national media 
and activist groups to focus on the problem of what came to be known 
ECOLOGICAL DEMOCRACY 7 (Daniel Faber ed., 1998) (citing the 1978 protest over New 
York's Love Canal as the birth of the environmental justice movement). 
13 See Stephen Sandweiss, The Social Construction of Environmental justice, in ENVIRON-
MENTAL INJUSTICES, POLITICAL STRUGGLES: RACE, CLASS, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 31 
(David E. Camacho ed., 1998); Samantha P. Fairchild, Environmentaljustice: An Overview, 18 
TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 111, 112 (2000); Eileen Gauna, Federal Environmental Citizen 
Provisions: Obstacles and Incentives on the Road to Envirollmentaljustice, 22 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1,9 
(1995). 
14 Ken Geiser & Gerry Waned., PCBs and Warren County, in UNEQUAL PROTECTION: 
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE AND COMMUNITIES 0.' COLOR, supra note II, at 43. 
15 See id. at 44, 46. 
16 Id. at 43-44. 
17 Seeid. at 51. 
\8 See id. at 50 (citing one protestor who proclaimed: "The trend is very clear. They 
would rather experiment with poor black people, [and) poor white people, than to ex-
periment with the middle and upper classes .... The regulations are such that [they) al-
low landfills to be placed in environmentally unsafe, but politically powerless areas."). 
19Id. at 50. 
20 See Geiser & Waneck, supra note 14, at 48-49. 
21 See id. at 50, 52. 
22 See Bullard, supra note 12, at 5. 
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as "environmental justice. "23 In this sense, the 'Varren County protests 
brought these issues to the forefront, and can be remembered as the 
spark that ignited the movement.24 
B. Evolution of the Movement 
Congressman Walter E. Fauntroy, Chairman of the Congressional 
Black Caucus in Washington, D.C., participated in the Warren County 
protests. 25 In fact, he was among the 500 arrested.26 Following this ex-
perience, Congressman Fauntroy requested that the General Ac-
counting Office (GAO)27 conduct a study to determine whether a re-
lationship existed between the location of hazardous waste landfills 
and the demographics of the communities that surround them.28 The 
GAO obliged, releasing a report the following year29 concluding that 
three out of four off-site landfills30 examined in eight southeastern 
states, were located in predominantly minority communities.31 Fur-
thermore, the study found that the percentage of people living below 
the poverty line in these areas r~~~petween 42 and 26%.32 Al-
though it did not conclusively establish a link between race, income, 
and hazardous waste,33 the report stimulated debate and spurred fur-
ther academic inquiry into the topic.34 
23 See id. at 5-6. 
24 See DAVID E. NEWTON, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: A REFERENCE HANDBOOK 2-3 
(1996). 
25 See Bullard, supra note 12, at 6: 
26 See Richard J. Lazarus, Pu rsuing ''Environmental Justice": The DistTibutional Effects of En-
vironmentalProtection, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 787, 801 n.49 (1993). 
27 On its Web site, the General Accounting Office claims: "The General Accounting 
Office (GAO) is the investigath'e arm of Congress. GAO exists to support Congress in 
meeting its Constitutional responsibilities and to heIp improve the performance and en-
sure the accountability of the federal government for the American people." See U.S. GEN. 
ACCOUNTING OUHE, at http://www.gao.gov (last visited Nov. 4, 2002). 
28 See CHRISTOPHER H. FOREMAN, JR., THE PROMISE AND PERIL OF ENVIRONMENTAL 
JUSTICE 18 (1998). 
29 See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUB. No. RCED-83-168, SITING OF HAZARDOUS 
WASTE LANDFILLS AND THEIR CORRELATION WITH RACIAL AND ECONOMIC STATUS OF SUR-
ROUNDING COMMUNITIES 1 (1983) [hereinafter GAO STUDY]. 
30 An off-site landfill is a landfill not connected to an industrial facility. See id. 
3! Id. 
32Id. 
33 The GAO report and other environmental justice studies ha\'e been criticized. E.g., 
THOMAS LAMBERT ET AL., NAT. LEGAL CENTER FOR TIlE PUB. INTEREST, A CRITIQUE OF 
"ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE," 3-7 (Jan. 1996) (a White Paper). 
34 See Lazarus, supra note 26, at 802-03. 
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The Vnited Church of Christ (VCC) , another Warren County 
participant, undertook the next major inquiry into the relationships 
between race, income, and environmental hazards.35 Vnlike previous 
efforts, the VCC's examination was national in scope.36 It released a 
report in 1987, revealing that r~the. .si~gle most significant fac-
tor associated with the location of license,q !lrr~ti~<.!ri:gQneg hazarOOus 
wasieTa~i1.ities:::Over otner vari"abies'"such as income, home ownership 
rates, and property values.37 The study identified a national pattern of 
race-based siting of toxic waste facilities, and suggested that affected 
communities may have been intentionally targeted because of their 
minority status.38 
Almost a decade after the Warren County protests, and following 
additional academic inquiries into the incidence of race and envi-
ronmental pollution,39 the environmental justice movement united.40 
The First National People of Color Environmental Leadership Sum-
mit (Summit), held in Washington, D.C., during the Fall of 1991, 
brought together minority leaders from every state to discuss the issue 
of environmental justice.41 The Summit resulted in a seventeen-point 
statement entitled Principles of Environmental Justice, wherein minority 
leaders pledged to build a national environmental justice movement 
to address the ecological threats facing minority and disadvantaged 
communities.42 The Summit is remembered as a watershed moment 
in the history of the environmental justice movement.43 Providing 
structure, organization, and solidarity, the Summit helped turn dis-
jointed grassroots efforts into a collective assembly of activists, all shar-
ing common objectives.44 
35 See id. at 801 (identifying the UCC study as one of the most widely acknowledged in 
connecting race with environmental risk). 
36 See Bullard, supra note 12, at 17. 
37 See COMM'N FOR RACIAL JUSTICE, UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST, TOXIC WASTES AND 
RACE IN THE UNITED STATES: A NATIONAL REPORT ON THE SOCIO-EcONOMIC CHARACTER-
ISTICS OF COMMUNITIES WITII HAZARDOUS WASTE SITES 15-16 (1987). 
gs See id. at 13. 
39 See generally Paul Mohai & Bunyan Bryant, Environmental Racism: Reviewing the Evi-
dence, in RACE AND THE INCIDENCE OF ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS 163 (Bunyan Bryant & 
Paul Mohai eds., 1992) (examining fifteen environmental justice studies undertaken be-
tween 1971 and 1992). 
40 See Karl Grossman, The People of Color Environmental Summit, in UNEQUAL PROTEC-
TION: ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE AND COMMUNITIES OF COLOR, supra note II, at 272. 
41 [d. 
42 See id. at 272-75. 
43 See Giovanna Di Chiro, Environmental Justice from the Grassroots: Reflections on History, 
Gender, and Expltrtise, in THE STRUGGLE FOR ECOLOGICAL DEMOCRACY, supra note 12, at 113. 
44 See id. at 113-16. 
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As interest in the environmen tal justice move men t increased, ad-
ditional evidence of discrimination emerged.45 In 1992, the National 
Law]ournal (NL]) released a landmark study uncovering glaring in-
equities in the way the government enforces environmental laws.46 
The NL] study examined the Environmental Protection Agency's 
(EPA) performance record at 1117 Superfund toxic waste sites47 and 
concluded: 
[P] enalties against pollution law violators in minority areas 
are lower than those imposed for violations in largely white 
areas. In an analysis of every residential toxic waste site in 
the 12-year-old Superfund program, the NL] also discovered 
the government takes longer to address hazards in minority 
communities, and it accepts solutions less stringent than 
those recommended by the scientific community.48 
In addition to a broad scope, the study also had a unique approach.49 
Instead of focusing on the minority population's proximity to envi-
ronmental hazards, the NL] study focused on the government's en-
forcement of environmental laws in minority communities, finding that 
laws were not enforced equally in minority communities as compared 
to predominantly white communities.5o As a result, the environmental 
justice movement expanded its focus from inequitable distribution of 
environmental burdens to include concerns about the unequal en-
forcement of environmentallaws.51 
C. The Modern EnvimnmentalJustice Movement 
The modern environmental justice movement was ushered in by 
a group of scholars and environmental activists who gathered at the 
University of Michigan School of Natural Resources to share ideas and 
45 See Robert D. Bullard, Decision lI1aking, in FACES OF ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM 5 
(Laura Westra & Peter S. Wenz eds., 1995). 
46 See id. 
47 Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 
42 U.S.C. § 9611 (2000) (creating a fund, known as the "Superfund," for use by EPA to 
clean up hazardous waste sites listed on the National Priorities List). 
48 Marianne Lavelle & Marcia Coyle, Unequal Protection: The Racial Divide in Environ-
mental Law: A Special Investigation, NK!"L LJ., Sept. 21, 1992, at S1. 
49 See Bullard, supra note 45, at 6. 
50 Lavelle & Coyle, supra note 48, at Sl ("This racial imbalance [in the enforcement of 
environmentallawsl ... often occurs whether the community is wealthy or poor."). 
51 See Bullard, supra note 45, at 6. 
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to search for solutions to the problem of environmental injustice.52 
Known as the Michigan Coalition, this group of twelve activist-scholars 
used both the GAO and the NL] studies (among others)53 to pressure 
EPA and other governmental agencies to explore the environmental 
problems facing poor and minority communities.54 
The Michigan Coalition was successfu1.55 In response to its ef-
forts, EPA formed a working group to study whether EPAwas insensi-
tive to socio-economic concerIJ.s affecting both_. m!Eor_~.!L_~IJ._d low-
income neighborhoods;56 Based on the results of a later study finding 
in the affirmative,57 ErA formed the...9ffice of Environmental Equity 
(later titled the Office ~f EI1Vir~I';men ~l j~sti-cerrn-order to develop 
and implement environ!1l~I.lt4lj!lstice initiatives.58 -.-
Legislatorsalso began to take note. In the period between 1992 
and 1994, several environmental justice bills were introduced in the 
House of Representatives.59 All failed to be enacted, but they suc-
ceeded in drawing attention to environmental justice issues and plac-
ing the topic squarely on the national political agenda.60 
Prodding from academics and activists, actions taken on the part 
of EPA, and studies completed by social scientists culminated in 
President Clinton issuing Executive Order No. 12,89861 on February 
11, 1994.62 Entitled Fedeml Actions to Address Environmental justice in 
52 See Bunyan Bryant & Paul Mohai, Introduction to RACE AND THE INCIDENT OF ENVI-
RONMENTAL HAZARDS, supra note 39, at 3. 
53 E.g., Mohai & Bryant, supra note 39, at 163-76 (providing a detailed discussion of 
additional studies). 
54 See Bryant & Mohai, supra note 52, at 4. 
55 See id. at 5 (noting that EPA's first public recognition of environmental justice issues 
was in reference to the coalition's meeting at the University of Michigan). 
56 See Clarice E. Gaylord & Elizabeth Bell, Environmental Justice: A National Priority, in 
FACES OF ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM, supra note 45, at 31-32. 
57 See generally U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, PUB. No. EPA-230-R-92-008A, ENVIRON-
MENTAL EQUITY: REDUCING RISK FOR ALL COMMUNITIES (1992) (uncovering "clear differ-
ences between racial groups in terms of disease and death rates" and concluding that 
"great opportunities exist for EPA and other government agencies to improve communica-
tion about environmental problems with members of low-income and racial minority 
groups"). 
58 See Gaylord & Bell, supra note 56, at 32. 
59 See, e.g., Environmental justice Act of 1993, S. 1161, 103d Congo (1993); Environ-
mental justice Act of 1993, H.R. 2105, 103d Congo (1993); The Environmental Equal 
Rights Act of 1993, H.R. 1924, 103d Congo (1993); Department of the Environment Act of 
1993, H.R. 109, 103d Congo (1993). 
60 See Knorr, supra note 6, at 85-90. 
61 See LUKE W. COLE & SHEILA R. FOSTER, FROM THE GROUND Up: ENVIRONMENTAL 
RACISM AND THE RISE OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE MOVEMENT 161-62 & n.25 (2001). 
62 Exec. Order No. 12,898 §§ 1-101 to 6-609, 59 Fed. Reg. 7629, 7629 (Feb. 11, 1994). 
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Minority Populations and Low-Income Populations, the Order held that 
"each Federal agency shall make achieving environmental justice part 
of its mission by identifying and addressing, as appropriate, dispro-
portionately high and adverse human health or environmental effects 
of its programs, policies, and activities on minority populations and 
low-income populations in the United States. "63 It went on to declare: 
Each Federal agency shall conduct its programs, policies, 
and activities that substantially affect human health or the 
environment, in a manner that ensures that such programs, 
policies, and activities do not have the effect of excluding 
persons (including populations) from participation in, deny-
ing persons (including populations) the benefits of, or sub-
jecting persons (including populations) to discrimination 
under, such programs, policies, and activities, because of 
their race, color, or national origin.64 
This Order provided the environmental justice movement with 
the structure and support it needed to begin solving the ecological 
problems facing low-income and minority communities, instead of 
just identifyingthem.65 Commentators praised the Order for giving the 
issue the treatment that it deserved.66 More specifically, as mandated 
by the Order, many federal agencies developed and implemented en-
vironmentaljustice principles into their decisionmaking processes.67 
In the years following Executive Order No. 12,898, EPA took on a 
more expansive role in championing environmental justice issues.68 
The Order itself called upon EPA to create a working group to pro-
vide guidance to other federal agencies on environmental justice is-
63 [d. § 1-101,59 Fed. Reg. at 7629. 
64 [d. § 2-2, 59 Fed. Reg. at 7630-31. 
65 See NEWTON, supra note 24, at 22-23. 
66 See, e.g., COLE & FOSTER, supra note 61, at 10; NEWTON, supra note 24, at 23 (calling 
the order "arguably the most important step to occur in the environmental justice move-
ment in its short history"); Bradford C. Mank, Executive Order 12,898, in THE LAW OF ENVI-
RONMENTALjUSTICE 103 (Michael B. Gerrard ed., 1999). 
67 Mank, supra note 66, at 114-31. The included agencies and departments in the or-
der are Agriculture, Commerce, Defense, Energy, Health and Human Sen'ices, Housing 
and Urban Development, Interior,Justice, Labor, National Aeronautics and Space Admini-
stration, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and Transportation. [d. at 114. 
68 See COLE & FOSTER, supra note 61, at 162-63; Denis Binder et aI., A Survey of Federal 
Agency Response to President Clinton's Executive Order No. 12898 on Environmental Justice, [2001 
News & Analysis) 31 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 11,133,11,140-42 (Oct. 2001). 
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sues.69 But EPA went beyond the requirements of the Executive Order 
by creating the National Environmental Justice Advisory Council (NE-
JAC) ,70 the Office of Environmental Justice,71 the Environmental Jus-
tice Steering Committee,72 and, the Office of Civil Rights.73 The ef-
forts of EPA and these sub-agencies were instrumental in weaving the 
movement's ideology into federal agency procedure.74 
Environmental justice made further strides under the Clinton 
Administration. The movement's goals tended to coincide with those 
of the Administration. For instance, President Clinton assigned two of 
69 Exec. Order No. 12,898 § I-1D2(a)-(b), 59 Fed. Reg. at 7629. Dubbed the "Inter-
agency Working Group on Environmental Justice," the group is composed of representa-
tives from various federal agencies. [d. § 1-102(a), 59 Fed. Reg. at 7629. The group is as-
signed the task of identifying environmental justice issues, developing strategies to prevent 
disparate impacts, and conducting research. [d. § 1-102(b), 59 Fed. Reg. at 7629; see also 
INTERAGENCY WORKING GROUP ON ENVTL. JUSTICE, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, at http:/ / 
www.epa.gov/compliance/environmentaljustice/ interagency /index.html (last visited Nov. 
7,2002). 
70 See generally NAT'L ENVTL. JUSTICE ADVISORY COUNCIL, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 
at http://www.epa.gov/ compliance/ environmentaljustice/nejac/index.html (last visited 
Nov. 7, 2002). "The National Environmental Justice Advisory Council (NEJAC) is a federal 
advisory committee that was established ... to provide independent advice, consultation, 
and recommendations to the Administrator of the ... [EPAJ on matters related to envi-
ronmentaljustice." [d. 
71 See generally OFFICE OF ENVTL. JUSTICE, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, at http://www. 
epa.gov/Compliance/resources/faqs/ej/index.html#faql (last visited Nov. 12, 2002) 
[hereinafter OFFICE OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE WEB SITEJ. "The Office oversees the inte-
gration of environmental justice into EPA's policies, programs, and activities throughout 
the Agency." [d. 
72 [d. The EPA Office of Environmental Justice's Web site describes the Committee as 
follows: 
[d. 
The Environmental Justice Executive Steering Committee is made up 
of senior managers representing each of the Headquarters offices and 
representatives from the regions. It provides leadership and direction 
on strategic planning, cross-media policy development, and ensures 
that coordination is implemented at all levels to ensure that environ-
mental justice is incorporated into Agency operations. 
73 See generally OFFICE OF CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. ENTVL. PROT. AGENCY, at http://www. 
epa.gov/ocrpagel/aboutocr.htm (last visited Nov. 7, 2002). "The Office of Civil Rights 
(OCR) ... serves as the principal adviser to the Administrator with respect to EPA's na-
tionwide internal and external equal opportunity and civil rights programs and policies. 
OCR also investigates and resolves complaints of unlawful discrimination either by EPA or 
its financial assistance recipients." [d. 
74 Cf COLE & FOSTER, supra note 61, at 163 (discussing how the National Environ-
mental Justice Advisory Committee "raised the stature of the Environmental Justice 
Movement to new heights"); Mank, supra note 66, at 107-09 (describing the efforts under-
taken by til" ~ub-agencies to alleviate environmental injustice). 
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the movement's leaders, Robert Bullard75 and Benjamin Chavis,76 to 
his transition team.77 In addition, Vice President AI Gore, a strong 
supporter of the environment and environmental justice, sponsored 
the Environmental Justice Act of 1992 while he was still in the Sen-
ate. 78 Finally, EPA Administrator Carol Browner, a Clinton appointee, 
quickly made environmental justice a top priority within EPA.79 
D. Environmental Justice Today 
It is too early to tell how environmental justice will fare under the 
George W. Bush Administration. However, there are some indications 
that it will remain a priority.80 In fact, the new EPA Administrator 
Christine Todd Whitman reaffirmed the agency's commitment to en-
vironmental justice stating, "Integration of environmental justice into 
the programs, policies, and activities [of EPA] ... is an Agency prior-
ity. "81 
It has been suggested that the future success of the environ-
mental justice movement depends on its ability to expand and con-
nect with other movements, thereby bolstering resources, power, and 
support in the political arena.82 Indeed, there are some indications 
that the environmental justice movement is headed in this direction 
already, as exemplified by the Environmental Justice and Climate 
75 Robert Bullard is a leading environmental justice activist and scholar. See NEWTON, 
supra note 24, at 69; Lazarus, supra note 26, at 803 n.61. 
76 Benjamin ChaYis was the head of the United Church of Christ and another promi-
nent leader in the movement. See COLE & FOSTER, supra note 61, at 20 n.5; NEWTON, supra 
note 24, at 71-72. 
77 COLE & FOSTER, supra note 61, at 32. 
78 SeeS. 2806, 102d Congo (1992). 
79 See OFFICE OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE WEB SITE, supra note 7l. The government 
Web site notes: 
Id. 
Because of the Agency's strong belief that all Americans regardless of race, 
color, national origin, or economic circumstance are important to the future 
of our nation and should be able to live in a clean, healthy environment, EPA 
Administrator Browner made environmental justice one of EPA's highest pri-
orities and established environmental justice as one of the seven guiding 
principles in the Agency's strategic plan in 1993. 
80 See generally Margaret Kriz, Coloring Justice Green, NAT'L J., July 28, 2001, available at 
2001 WL 25925949. 
81 Memorandum from Christine Todd Whitman, EPA Administrator, to EPA Officials 
on EnvironmentalJustice Policy (Aug. 9,2001), athttp://www.epa. gov/swerosps/ejlhtml-
doc/ ejmemo.htm. 
82 See, e.g., COLE & FOSTER, supra note 61, at 164-65; DAVID SCHLOSBERG, ENVIRON-
MENTAL JUSTICE AND THE NEW PLURALISM 192-94 (1999). 
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Change Coalition, which is comprised of environmental justice lead-
ers and climate change activists.83 Academics think that such unions 
will increase the support for environmental justice concerns, broaden 
the political debate over such issues, and will eventually result in a 
progressive coalition of diverse leaders striving toward the same 
goal.84 Additionally, environmental justice may be able to seep into 
new areas of the political arena where no one would have thought it 
belonged. 
E. Growth of a Movement 
Two authors have suggested a particularly apt metaphor for cap-
turing the history of the environmental justice movement: a river, fed 
over time by many tributaries.85 "No one tributary made the river the 
force that it is today; indeed, it is difficult to point to the headwaters, 
since so many tributaries have nourished the movement."86 In this 
sense, the movement is the product of a diverse combination of ef-
forts and strategies. Because of this diversity, the movemen t is never 
the same for very long.87 It grows as new streams add to the flow, it 
shifts in response to bumps in the topography, and it deepens as new 
strategies for advancement emerge.88 
II. THE CREATION OF THE FEDERAL ENERGY RESOURCE COMMISSION 
Shortly before the rise of the environmental justice movement, 
Congress established the Federal Energy Resource Commission 
(FERC).89 The following section covers the creation of FERC, its in-
dependence, and its record on environmental matters. 
A. Hist01Y ofFERC 
FERC was created within the Department of Energy (DOE)90 in 
response to a congressional finding that the "United States faces an 
83 See Leading Environmental Justice. Climate Justice, Religious, Policy Organizations Unite To 
Call for Action on Climate Change, U.S. NEWSWIRE, Jan. 28, 2002, available at 2002 WL 
4573681. 
84 See COLE & FOSTER, supra note 61, at 165. 
85 See id. at 20. 
86 Id. 
87 See id. 
88 See id. 
89 Department of Energy Organization Act, § 401, 42 U .S.C. § 7171 (a) (1977). 
9(J Id. 
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increasing shortage of nonrenewable energy sources, "91 and the belief 
that "this energy shortage and ... increasing dependence on foreign 
energy supplies presents a serious threat to the national security of 
the United States and the health, safety and welfare of its citizens."92 
Legislators hoped that FERC and DOE would be able to effectively 
manage the energy concerns of the government, develop a coordi-
nated energy policy, and implement that policy effectively with an eye 
towards the future.93 
FERC is the successor to the Federal Power Commission (FPC), 
an agency established under the Federal Water Power Act of 1920.94 
FPC was charged with general authority over the development and 
control of waterpower.95 It was created, in part, out of fear that the 
United States' involvement in World War I had depleted coal and oil 
reserves to dangerously low levels, and that waterpower provided an 
effective alternate energy source.96 Jurisdictional authority for FPC 
derived from Congress's power to regulate commerce over the na-
tion's navigable waters.97 
In 1977, Congress transferred the powers of FPC to FERC.98 Over 
the next twenty-five years, Congress allocated additional responsibili-
ties to FERC through subsequent legislation, including the Natural 
Gas Act,99 the Natural Gas Policy Act,100 the Public Utility Regulatory 
Policies Act of 1978,101 and the Office of Federal Procurement Policy 
91 Id. § 7111(1). 
92Id. § 7111 (2). 
93 Id. § 7112(2)-(5). 
94 See Federal Water Power Act of 1920, Pub. L. No. 66-289, 41 Stat. 1063 (current ver-
sion at 16 U.S.C. §§ 791a, 792, 793, 796-818, 820-823, 823a-823c, 824, 824a-824m, 825, 
825a-8250, 8250-1, 825p, 825q, 825q-l, 825r (2000)). The current version is known as the 
Federal Power Act. 16 U.S.C. § 791a. 
95 See 16 U.S.C. § 797(a)-(g). 
96 See Michael C. Blumm & Viki A. Nadol, The Decline oj the Hydropower Czar and the Rise 
oj Agency Pluralism in Hydroelectric Rclicensing, 26 COLUM.j. ENVTL. L. 81, 86 (2001). 
97 16 U.S.C. § 797(e). 
98 Department of Energy Organization Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7172(a) (1). Essentially, FERC 
took over for FPC, and began overseeing waterpower along with the sale of electricity and 
gas. Seeid. § 7172(a)(I)(A)-(F). 
99 Natural Gas Act, ch. 556, 52 Stat. 821 (1938) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 717, 
717a-717w (2000)). 
100 Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, Pub.L. 95-621, Nov. 9,1978,92 Stat. 3350 (current 
version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 3301, 3361-3364, 3371-3375, 3391-3394, 3411, 3412, 3414-3416, 
3418,3431,3432 (2000)). 
101 Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 
(1978) (codified as amended in scattered sections ofl5 U.S.C., 16 U.S.C. & 43 U.S.C.)). 
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ACt.102 As a result, FERC maintains broad regulatory authority over 
the "development of waterpower and resources ... electric utility 
companies engaged in interstate commerce, and ... the transporta-
tion and sale of natural gas" across state lines,l°3 
B. FERC as an Independent Agent)' 
While DOE was designated as an executive agency under the con-
trol of the President,104 FERC was created as an independent regula-
tory commission. lo5 The difference between the two is essentially one 
of political control: 
The President's power over the heads of independent agen-
cies, whom he can remove only "for cause," is ... considered 
to be substan tially weaker than is his power over the heads of 
"executive branch" agencies, who can be removed for any 
reason or no reason at all. From this, the inference is drawn 
that the regulatory commissions are "independent" of presi-
dential power. I06 
The justification offered "for making agencies independent is 
that since they exercise adjudicatory powers requiring impartial ex-
pertise, political interference is undesirable."lo7 FERC's independence 
stems from its ability to regulate sensitive topics, namely power trad-
ing. IOB Some courts have questioned the constitutionality of such 
102 Office of Federal Procurement Policy Act, 41 U.S.C. §§ 401-402 (1974) (repealed 
1996). 
103 64 AM. JUR. 2D Public Utilities § 207 (2001); see also FERC, ABOUT FERC, at 
http://www.ferc.fed.us/About/about.htm (last visited Nov. 7, 2002) [hereinafter ABOUT 
FERC1. FERC's primary responsibilities include: (1) regulating "the transmission and sale 
of natural gas for resale in interstate commerce"; (2) regulating "the transmission of oil by 
pipeline in interstate commerce"; (3) regulating "the transmission and wholesale sales of 
electricity in interstate commerce"; (4) licensing and inspecting "private, municipal and 
state hydroelectric projects"; (5) oversight of "environmental matters related to natural 
gas, oil, electricity and hydroelectric projects"; (6) administering "accounting and financial 
reporting regulations on the conduct of jurisdictional companies"; and (7) approving "site 
choices as well as abandonment of interstate pipeline facilities." ABOUT FERC supra. 
104 Department of Energy Organization Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7131 (2000). 
105 Id. § 7171 (a). 
106 Geoffrey P. Miller, Introduction: The Debate of Independent Agencies in Light of Empirical 
Evidence, 1988 DUKE LJ. 215, 217. 
107 Consumer Energy Council of Am. v. FERC, 673 F.2d 425,472 (D.C. Cir. 1982), afl'd 
memo sub nom. Process Gas Consumers Group v. Consumer Energy Council of Am., 463 V.S. 
1216 (1983). 
108 See generally H.R. CONF. REp. No. 95-539 (1978), l'eprinted in 1977 V.S.C.C.A.N. 925 
(discussing the creation of FERC as an independent regulatory agency to prevent abuse in 
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agencies, finding that they become, in effect, a "headless fourth 
branch" of government under a constitution that calls for only 
three.109 The concern is that as these agencies are not accountable to 
the executive branch, are renegade in nature, and present the possi-
bility of bureaucratic abuse. llo In short, independent agencies lack 
political accountability. Judges, however, have historically rejected 
these arguments,lll settling the constitutionality of independent 
agencies. I 12 
FERC, then, stands as an agency "independent of executive 
authority ... and is thus free to exercise its judgment without the 
leave or hindrance of any other official. "1l3 Such independence leaves 
the Commission isolated and impacts its consideration of environ-
men tal justice principles. 
C. FERC and the Environment 
Throughout its tenure, FERC has repeatedly come under fire for 
failing to adequately respond to environmental concerns, especially 
those relating to the preservation of natural resources, in particular, 
fish habitats and spawning grounds.1 l4 Traditionally, these criticisms 
have stemmed from FERC's role in the development and operation of 
the power trading industry). Power trading involves the sale of wholesale electric power. 
FERC, WHAT FERC DOES, at http://www.ferc.fed.us/home/whalfercdoes.asp. FERC ap-
proves the pricing for such transactions. Id. 
109 See Synar v. United States, 626 F. Supp.1374, 1398 (D.D.C. 1986), a/I'd on other 
grounds sub nom. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986). The court also commented, "It is 
not as obvious today as it seemed in the 1930's that there can be such things as genuinely 
'independent' regulatory agencies .... " Id. 
\10 See Jeffrey H. Bowman, The Constitutionality of Independent Regulatory Agencies Under 
the Necessary and Proper Clause: The Case of the Federal Election Commission, 4 YALE.J. ON REG. 
363,366-68 (1987). 
III See Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 723-28. 
112 Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 632 (1935) (holding that in-
dependent agencies are constitutional). 
113 Id. at 625-26 (discussing the creation of the Federal Trade Commission, another 
independent agency). 
\14 See, e.g., Blumm & Nadol, supra note 96, at 88 ("Unfortunately, FERC historically 
has resisted not only [the Electric Consumer Protection Act's] requirements, but also 
other statutory measures protective of environmental interests. "); F. Lorraine Bodi, FERC's 
Mid-Columbia Proceeding: Ten Years and Still Counting, 16 ENVTL. L. 555, 580 (1986) ("The 
mid-Columbia proceeding is a prime example of FERC's inability to deal promptly and 
effectively with requests to modify existing project licenses and protect fishery resources. "); 
Lydia T. Grimm, Fishery Protection and FERC Hydropower Relicensing Under EPCA: Maintaining 
a Deadly Status Quo, 20 ENVTL. L. 929, 930 (1990) ("FERC sees itself as an energy agency 
making decisions that affect power needs and economics rather than an environmental 
agency making decisions that affect natural resources."j. 
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hydropower, but recent charges have focused on FERC's role in the 
continued burning of fossil fuels to accommodate our nation's energy 
requirements. l15 These critiques are important for understanding how 
FERC operates in the environmental arena, and specifically, how 
FERC has responded to environmental justice concerns. 
1. FERC and Hydropower 
Through the provisions of the FPA, FERC is vested with the re-
sponsibility of overseeing the life cycle of all dams under its jurisdic-
tion, from preliminary licensing to abandonment. 116 This authority 
places the Commission in a unique position. On one hand, FERC was 
created, in part, to help solve energy problems by decreasing the na-
tion's dependence on foreign energy.117 The promotion of hydro-
power is particularly suited to this goal because dams provide inex-
pensive, easily-stored power.118 On the other hand, the continued 
operation of hydroelectric dams, which often threatens fish, wildlife, 
and water quality, can lead to disastrous consequences for the envi-
ronment. 119 These competing interests often boil down to a choice 
between economics and the environment, pitting industry against ac-
tivist. 120 In the context of hydropower, critics contend that on too 
many occasions FERC has sided with industry at the expense of the 
115 Harvey Wasserman, Power Struggle. (Economic A.spects of Utilities Deregulation), MUL TI-
NAT'L MONIToR,June 1, 2001, at 9, available at 2001 WL 15520488. 
116 See Department of Energy Organization Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7172(a) (1) (A), (D) 
(2000). 
117 See id. § 7111 (2). 
118 See Kurt Stephenson, Taking Nature into Account: Observations About the Changing Role 
of Analysis and Negotiation in Hydropower Re-Licensing, 25 WM. & MARY ENVTI .. L. & POL'y 
REV. 473, 474 (2000). In addition, waterpower is "clean" in the sense that it does not pro-
duce the typical air pollution associated with the combustion of fossil fuels. See Beth C. 
Bryant, FERC's Dam Decommissioning Authority Under the Federal Power Act, 74 WASH. L. REV. 
95,97 (1999); Charles R. Sensiba, Comment, Who's in Charge Here? The Shrinking Role of the 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission in Hydropower Relicensing, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 603, 609-
10 (1999). 
119 See Stephenson, supra note 118, at 475. See generally Michael T. Pyle, Beyond Fish Lad-
ders: Dam Removal as a Strategy for Restoring America's Rivers, 14 STAN. ENVTL. LJ. 97 (1995) 
(reviewing the environmental dangers posed by dams, including threats to fish, plant life, 
and rivers). 
120 See Stephenson, supra note 118, at 477. But see ZYGMUNT J,B. PLATER ET AI.., ENVI-
RONMENTAl. LAW AND POLICY: NATURE, LAW, AND SOCIETY 36 (2d ed. 1998) (stating that 
the perceived choice between "progress" and environmental quality is, to most modern 
em'ironmental analysts, simply a classic false tradeoff: "In the long term both goals are 
inseparable; in the short term they can and must be reconcilable."). 
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environment, creating an underlying tension between activists and 
the Commission.121 
Much of the early concern over FERC's hydropower regulation 
stemmed from the "sweeping authority" granted to FERC's predeces-
sor, the FPC, under the FPA.122 Although slowly eroding over the 
years, FERC still maintains "a broad and paramount federal regula-
tory role" over hydropower,123 leaving opponents of FERC decisions 
with few options for challenging the Commission's reasoning. As a 
result, FERC decisions are, to a degree, insulated from environmental 
challenges.124 
2. Statutory Inroads 
The situation is beginning to change. In the years following 
FERC's creation, a deluge of lawsuits have been filed against the 
Commission, generally charging that FERC failed to adequately take 
the public interest into account in its decisions.125 Subsequently, in 
1986, Congress amended the Federal Power Act by enacting the Elec-
tric Consumers Protection Act of 1986 (ECPA).126 This legislation re-
quired FERC to give "equal consideration to the purposes of energy 
conservation, the protection, mitigation of damage to, and enhance-
ment of fish and wildlife, the protection of recreational opportunities, 
and the preservation of other aspects of environmental quality."127 
The aim of Congress was to ensure that FERC's licensing decisions 
would now incorporate both developmental and non-developmental 
values, thus balancing both energy and environmental concerns.t28 In 
1992, Congress built on this foundation by passing the Energy Policy 
121 See. e.g., Bryant supra note 118, at 96 (declaring that FERC "earned a reputation as a 
friend of the hydroelectricity industry and a nemesis of environmentalists"); Stephenson, 
supra note 118 at 487-88 (recognizing that FERC has been charged with placing too much 
emphasis on hydropower interests). 
122 See Scenic Hudson Pres. Conference v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 354 F.2d 608, 613 
(2d Cir. 1965) ("Congress gave the Federal Power Commission sweeping authority and a 
specific planning responsibility."). 
123 California v. FERC, 495 U.S. 490, 499 (1990). 
124 See Stephenson, supra note 118, at 484-85. 
125 See Michael C. B1umm, it Trilogy of Tribes v. FERC: Reforming the Federal Role il1 Hydro-
power Licensing, 10 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 2-6 (1986). The author notes that thirty-four 
lawsuits were filed by 1984 in response to FERC's hydroelectric decisions. !d. at 3. 
126 Electric Consumers Protection Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 99-495, 100 Stat. 1243 
(1986) (codified in scattered sections ofl6 U.S.C. §§ 791a-825r (2000)). 
127 16 U.S.C. § 797(e) (2000). 
128 See Grimm, supra note 114, at 943. 
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Act (EPACT).129 Although intended primarily to develop competition 
among electric utilities, EPACT also included measures protecting 
fish. 130 Together, ECPA and EPACT have had the effect of limiting 
FERC's ability to override competing interests and to unilaterally im-
pose its own licensing conditions.131 
3. Judicial Inroads 
Similarly, courts have also made inroads against FERC's broad 
regulatory authority.132 In PUD No.1 v. Washington Department of Ecol-
ogy, the U.S. Supreme Court refused to limit the State of Washington's 
authority to impose its own water quality standards, rejecting the the-
ory that such standards interfered with FERC's authority to license 
hydroelectric projects.133 Thus, state authorities could "condition [hy-
dropower] certification upon any limitations necessary to ensure 
compliance with state water quality standards or any other 'appropri-
ate requirement of State law. "'134 More recently, the Ninth Circuit ex-
tended this reasoning by allowing federal fishery agencies to require 
that FERC licensing decisions integrate recommendations regarding 
the protection of fish. 135 These two decisions demonstrate that the 
courts also support the consideration of non-developmental values in 
the FERC decision making process. 136 
The upshot of these developments is that FERC no longer has 
the final word on how its decisions affect the environment.137 
The decrease of the Commission's autonomy favors a more rep-
resentative and inclusive scheme of environmental decisionmaking.138 
It remains to be seen whether this trend will impact FERC's environ-
men tal justice views. 
129 Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, 106 Stat. 2776 (1992) (codified in 
scattered sections of 16 U.S.c., 25 U.S.C., 26 U.S.C., 30 U.S.C. & 42 U.S.C.). 
130 See 16 U.S.C. § 811 (2000) (directing FERC to protect fish and their natural migra-
tory patterns by requiring dam licensees to construct a fishway so fish have safe passage 
around a river dam). 
131 See Stephenson, supra note 118, at 488. 
132 See, e.g., PUD No.1 v. Wash. Dep't of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700, 701-02 (1994). 
133 See id. 
134 Id. at 713-14. 
135 See Am. Rivers v. FERC, 201 F.3d 1186, 1206-11 (9th Cir. 2000). 
136 See Blumm & Nadol, supra note 96, at 117. 
137 See Sarah C. Richardson, The Changing Political Landscape of Hydropower Project Reli-
censing, 25 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'y REV. 499, 531 (2000). 
138 See generally Donald H. Clarke, Relicensing Hydropower: The Many Faces of Competition, 
11 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 8 (1996) (discussing how FERC has increasingly taken non-
developmental considerations into account when formulating policy). 
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The Department of Energy (DOE), FERC's parent agency, has 
pledged to be a world leader in environmental justice.139 In 1995, 
DOE released its EnvironmentalJustice Strategy proclaiming: 
[L] eadership in science and technology, coupled with the 
incorporation of environmental justice options into our 
management infrastructure, will establish us as a world 
leader in emironmental technology development and appli-
cation. This will enhance the Department's role as a key con-
tributor in the Nation's effort to develop and apply sustain-
able, clean, and economically competitive energy technol-
ogies in order to improve the quality of life for all and facili-
tate en\ironmental justice for our communities, both na-
tionwide and globally.140 
DOE explicitly views environmental justice as an instrumental part of 
its quest to become a "world leader" in environmental technology de-
velopment. 141 
In glaring contrast, FERC does not have an environmental justice 
strategy.142 As a result, challengers must resort to outside authorities 
when attacking a FERC decision on environmental justice grounds.143 
Petitioners have traditionally relied upon three authorities in 
framing legal challenges to perceived environmental injustices: 
139 See U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE 
STRATEGY EXECUTIVE ORDER 12,898, APR. 1995 (1995) (identifying five factors in regards 
to environmental justice by which "the Department of Energy will function in a leadership 
role"), available at http://www.em.doe.gov/ stake/ emjus.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2002). 
140 See id. The Department of Energy anticipated that it could achieve its goals by: (1) 
Heightening its "sensitivity to identifying and addressing disproportionately high and ad-
verse human health and environmental effects of ... [its] programs, policies, and activities 
on minority communities and low-income communities"; (2) "[p]rotecting human health 
and restoring the quality of the environment and level of safety" for its workers' communi-
ties; (3) "[e]nsuring full compliance with existing environmental, health, and safety laws, 
regulations, and statutes"; 4) "[e]nhancing procedures to detect and mitigate potential 
disproportionately high and adverse human health or environmental effects of ... [its] 
planned programs, policies, and activities and to promote non-discrimination among vari-
ous population segments"; and (5) "[f]ocusing on a 'Partnership in Participation Ap-
proach' with ... [its] stakeholders including the general public, affected communities, 
Federal, Tribal, State, and local governments in the early stages of planning and imple-
menting environmental justice procedures." Id. 
141 See id. 
142 See generally ABOUT FERe, supra note 103. 
143 See id. 
372 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 30:353 
(1) Executive Order No. 12,898; (2) Title VI of the Civil Rights Act; 
and (3) the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution.144 The 
following discussion examines this tripartite strategy, and concludes 
that it offers little chance of success against FERC. 
A. Executive Onier No. 12,898 
Executive Order No. 12,898 requires "each federal agency" to 
incorporate environmental justice into its decisionmaking process.145 
Since its inception in 1994, the Order has had a profound effect.146 
Many federal agencies have responded by implementing environ-
mental justice strategies into their respective administrative judg-
ments.147 For reasons explored below, however, FERC is not among 
them. 
1. Scope of the Order 
On its face, Executive Order No. 12,898 applies to "each federal 
agency. "148 However, a closer examination reveals that the Order is 
limited in scope. Section 6-604 states that "for purposes of this order, 
Federal agency means any agency on the working group, and such 
other agencies as may be designated by the President, that conducts 
any Federal program or activity that substantially affects human 
health or the environment."149 The working group150 is made up of 
144 See generally, Luke W. Cole, Environmental Justice Litigation: Another Stone in David's 
Sling, 21 FORDHAM URB. LJ. 523 (1994) (discussing traditional methods of challenging 
environmental injustice). 
145 Exec. Order No. 12,898, § 1-101,59 Fed. Reg. 7629, 7629 (Feb. 11, 1994). 
146 See Mank, supra note 66, at 132. 
147 See id. These strategies include enhanced public participation, research gathering, 
protection of natural resources, and enforcement measures related to environmental jus-
tice.ld. 
148 Exec. Order No. 12,898, § 1-101,59 Fed. Reg. at 7629. 
149Id. § 6-604, 59 Fed. Reg. at 7629. 
150 Discussed supra notes 69-76 and accompanying text. 
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seventeen agencies, including FERC's parent agency, the DOE.151 
FERC, however, is not included on the list. 152 
Section 6-604 goes on to state that "[iJndependent agencies are 
requested to comply with the provisions of this order. "153 As previously 
discussed, FERC was created as an independent agency.154 Although 
some courts have questioned the distinction between independent 
and executive agencies in the modern era,155 the language of the Or-
der is clear; Executive No. Order 12,898 does not explicitly bind 
FERC.156 
2. Judicial Review 
There are other weaknesses in the seemingly strong language of 
the Executive Order. The Order is qualified in large part by section 6-
609, which reads: 
This order is intended only to improve the internal man-
agement of the executive branch and is not intended to, nor 
does it create any right, benefit, or trust responsibility, sub-
stantive or procedural, enforceable at law or equity by a party 
against the United States, its agencies, its officers, or any per-
son. This order shall not be construed to create any right to 
judicial review involving the compliance or noncompliance 
151 Exec. Order No. 12,898, § 1-102(a), 59 Fed. Reg. at 7629. Other agencies include 
the Department of Defense, Department of Health and Human Services, Department of 
Housing and Urban Development, Department of Labor, Department of Agriculture, De-
partment of Transportation, Department of Justice, Department of Interior, Department 
of Commerce, Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Management and Budget, 
Office of Science and Technology Policy, Office of the Deputy Assistant to the President 
for Environmental Policy, Office of the Assistant to the President for Domestic Policy, Na-
tional Economic Council, and Council of Economic Advisors. [d. 
152 See id. 
153 [d. § 6-604, 59 Fed. Reg. at 7632. 
154 Department of Energy Organization Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7171 (a) (2000); infra Part 
III.B. 
155 See Consumer Energy Council of Am. v. FERC, 673 F.2d 425, 472 (D.C. Cir. 1982) 
(noting in regard to independent and executive agencies that "[tl here has been a general 
breakdown in any distinction between the functions of the two types of agenc[ies] "), afl'd 
memo sub nom. Process Gas Consumers Group V. Consumer Energy Council of Am., 463 U.S. 
1216 (1983). 
156 See, e.g., City of Tacoma, Washington, 86 F.E.R.C. 161,311 (1999) (recognizing that 
FERC is an independent agency and, as such, Executive Order 12,898 does not apply), 
1999 WL 177637, at *2. 
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of the United States, its agencies, its officers, or any other 
person with this order.157 
Thus, by foreclosing any rights against federal agencies for non-
compliance, and by precluding the possibility of judicial review, sec-
tion 6-609 reduces the Order's bold pronouncements into a "paper 
tiger" of sorts.158 FERC has cited this final clause as a reason for dis-
missing environ men tal justice claims brought against it in administra-
tive proceedings.159 
B. Title W of the 1964 Civil Rights Act 
Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act prohibits discrimination in 
the administration of programs receiving federal financial assis-
tance. 160 Many commentators have praised Title VI as a valuable legal 
tool for presenting environmental justice challenges.161 Title VI pro-
vides two vehicles that minority groups162 may employ to seek relief 
from environmental injustice: section 601 and section 602.163 How-
ever, due to the procedural difficulties involved in bringing a Title VI 
claim, advocates of environmental justice will likely be unsuccessful in 
using it to challenge a FERC decision. 164 
157 Exec. Order No. 12,898, § 6-609, 59 Fed. Reg. at 7632-33. 
158 See Sandweiss, supra note 13, at 44 (noting that "[tlhe order does not compel any 
particular substantive result, it only mandates consideration of environmental justice crite-
ria"); cf PLATER ET AL., supra note 120, at 615 (comparing the National Environmental 
Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) to a "paper tiger"). The authors comment that NEPA "contains 
a great deal of poetic language and precious little that is mandatory." Id. 
159 See, e.g., City of Tacoma, 86 F.E.R.C. ~ 61,311 (1999) (finding that the Order "is in-
tended to improve the internal management of the Executive Branch, [and] does not 
create any legally enforceable rights"), 1999 WL 177637, at *2. Still, for the agencies that 
have adopted the Order's principles, it has become a valuable tool for fighting environ-
mental injustice. See Mank, supra note 66, at 133 (noting that administrative law judges for 
EPA, NRC, and the Department of the Interior have upheld the order in administrative 
proceedings) . 
160 See Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 601, 42 U.S.C. § 2001d (2000). 
161 See, e.g., Michael Fisher, Environmental Racism Claims Brought Under Title VI of the Civil 
Rights Act, 25 ENVTL. L. 285, 287 (1995) (arguing that Title VI provides an effective means 
for presenting environmental justice claims); Bradford C. Mank, Title VI, in THE LAW OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE, supra note 66, at 23 (finding that Title VI offers "the best oppor-
tunity" for bringing environmental inequity challenges). But see Steven A. Light & Kathryn 
R.L. Rand, Is Title VI a Magic Bullet? Environmental Racism in the Context of Political-Economic 
Processes and Imperatives, 2 MICH. J. RACE & L. 1, 47-49 (1996) (questioning the efficacy of 
Title VI and cautioning environmental justice proponen ts against overreliance). 
162 Unlike Executive Order No. 12,898, Title VI does not apply to low-income commu-
nities. See Civil RightsActofl964, § 601, 42 U.S.c. § 2001d. 
163 See id. §§ 601, 602, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d, 2000d-1. 
164 See infra Part III.B.2. 
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1. Generally 
Section 601 declares that "[n]o person in the United States shall, 
on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from 
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to dis-
crimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial 
assistance."165 This means that recipients of federal funding may not 
discriminate on the basis of race, color, or national origin.166 To pre-
vail under section 601, the courts have long required that petitioners 
demonstrate proof of discriminatory intent. 167 This requirement poses 
a formidable burden for environmental justice plaintiffs and, as a re-
sult, many turned to section 602 for relief. 168 
In short, section 602 instructs agencies that distribute federal 
funds to abide by section 601 's anti-discrimination requirements. 169 
Unlike section 601, however, section 602 has been interpreted as re-
quiring only a showing of disparate impact, not discriminatory in-
tent. 170 Under this interpretation, private plaintiffs did not have the 
difficult job of proving that an agency was motivated by discrimination 
in arriving at a decision; rather, plaintiffs proceeded by showing that 
the agency's decision disproportionately affected minority popula-
tions. l7l 
As a result of this interpretation, early cases brought under sec-
tion 602 showed great promise for environmental justice pro po-
nents. 172 Recently, however, the Supreme Court, in Alexander v. Sando-
val, retreated from this position, declaring that private parties do not 
165 Civil Rights Act of1964, § 601, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d. 
166 See Julia B. Latham Worsham, Disparate Impact Lawsuits Under Title VI, Section 602: 
Can a Legal Tool Build Environmental Justice?, 27 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 631, 644-45 
(2000). 
167 See Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Servo Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582.610-11 (1983) (Powell,]., 
concurring); Julie H. Hurwitz & E. Quita Sullivan, Using Civil Rights Laws to Challenge Envi-
ronmental Racism: From Bean to Guardians to Chester to Sandoval, 2 ].L. SOC'Y 5, 23-24 
(2001). 
168 See Hurwitz & Sullivan, supra note 167, at 24-25; Latham Worsham, supra note 166, 
at 646. 
169 See Latham Worsham, supra note 166, at 645. Section 602 reads: "Each Federal de-
partment and agency which is empowered to extend Federal financial assistance to any 
program or activity ... is authorized and directed to effectuate the provisions of sec-
tion 2000d of this title." Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 602, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1. 
170 See Lazarus, supra note 26, at 834. 
171 See id. 
172 See, e.g., Lau V. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 568 (1974) (allowing plaintiff to proceed un-
der disparate impact theory); Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living v. Seif, 132 
F.3d 925, 937 (3d Cir. 1997) (holding that parties may proceed under section 602 on a 
showing of discriminatory effect alone), vacated, 524 U.S. 974 (1998). 
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have standing to sue under section 602.173 Because there is now no 
private enforcement right under section 602, private plaintiffs must 
turn back to section 601 for relief, requiring proof of discriminatory 
intent.174 Thus, "[i]f plaintiffs cannot prove intentional discrimina-
tion, they cannot sue under Title VI or its regulations, even if they can 
prove that the challenged action has a discriminatory impact for 
which no justification can be shown."175 As a result, Title VI's ability to 
alleviate environmental injustice may be mutedP6 
2. As Applied to FERC 
Even if a party could provide evidence of discriminatory intent in 
a FERC regulatory decision, it appears that Title VI does not apply 
directly to federal agencies. As noted, Title VI applies to "any program 
or activity receiving Federal financial assistance."177 The terms "pro-
gram" or "activity" are defined as: (1) "a department, agency, special 
purpose district, or other instrumentality of a State or of a local gov-
ernment;"178 (2) "a college, university, or other postsecondary institu-
tion, or a public system of higher education;"179 or (3) "an entire cor-
poration, partnership, or other private organization, or an entire sole 
proprietorship. "ISO Thus, Title VI covers "only those situations where 
federal funding is given to a non-federal entity which, in turn, pro-
vides financial assistance to the ultimate beneficiary."181 Therefore, 
Title VI does not apply to discrimination by federal agencies them-
173 See 532 U.S. 275, 293 (2001); Lisa S. Core, Note, Alexander v. Sandoval: Why a Su-
preme Court Case About Driver's Licenses Matters to Environmental Justice Advocates, 30 B.C. 
ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 191, 193-213, 224-28 (2002). In a five-to-four decision the majority 
declared, "Neither as originally enacted nor as later amended does Title VI display an in-
tent to create a freestanding private right of action to enforce regulations promulgated 
under § 602. We therefore hold that no such right of action exists." 532 U.S. at 293. 
174Id. 
175 Adele P. Kimmel et aI., The Sandoval Decision and Its Implications for Future Civil Rights 
Enforcement, 76 FLA. BJ. 24, 24 (Jan. 2002). 
176 Cf. Core, supra note 173, at 236-42 (arguing that Sandoval also "signaled the impos-
sibility of using 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as an enforcement mechanism" for disparate impact regu-
lations enacted pursuant to section 602 of Title VI). But see Kimmel et aI., supra note 175, 
at 27 (noting that the Sandoval decision "leaves open the question of whether Title Vi's 
disparate impact regulations may be enforced against public recipients of federal funds 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983"). 
177 Civil Rights Act of 1964,42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2000). 
178Id. § 2000d-4a(l) (A). 
179Id. § 2000d-4a(2) (A). 
180 Id. § 2000d-4a(3)(A). 
181 Soberal-Perez v. Heckler, 717 F.2d 36, 38 (2d Cir. 1983). 
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selves.182 Accordingly, FERC appears to be immune from Title VI 
claims.183 
C. Equal Protection Clause 
The Equal Protection Clause has become one of the most disfa-
vored theories for environmental justice advocates to employ in chal-
lenging discriminatory actions. 184 In fact, some critics have opined 
that equal protection claims should only be included in an environ-
mental justice complaint for political value.185 Perhaps this is because 
not a single environmental justice proponent has ever prevailed on 
equal protection grounds in federal court.186 This is not for a lack of 
trying.187 
1. Generally 
The Fifth Amendment of the Constitution declares that "[n]o 
person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty, or property without the 
due process of law."188 In addition, the Fourteenth Amendment de-
crees that a state may not "deny to any person within its jurisdiction 
the equal protection of the laws."189 Together, these two clauses have 
Id. 
182 See Williams v. Glickman, 936 F. Supp. 1, 6 (D.D.C. 1996). The court stated: 
The plaintiffs claim that it would be "inconceivable" that Title VI should not 
apply to discrimination by federal agencies. However, the language of the 
statute and the cases addressing the issue support just that conclusion. The 
Court does not have the authority to redraft an unambiguous statute and ig-
nore established case authority. Therefore, the Court will also dismiss the 
plaintiffs' Title VI claims. 
183 However, environmental justice advocates could bring suit against a state or local 
agency that received federal funding from FERC and subsequently discriminated in its 
decisionmaking process. See Heckler, 717 F.2d at 38. 
184 See, e.g., Cole. supra note 144, at 540-41 (suggesting that the equal protection doc-
trine is the worst option for plaintiffs looking to challenge environmental discrimination); 
Donna Gareis-Smith, Enviroll1/1ental Racism: The Failure of Equal Protection to Provide a Judicial 
Remedy and the Pote1ltial of Title 17 of the 1964 Civil Rights A.ct, 13 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 
57, 58 (1994) (finding that the requirements of the Equal Protection Clause ha\'e pre-
sented the most significant hurdle for plaintiffs); Lazarus, supra note 26, at 829-35 (stating 
that the equal protection doctrine has not been hospitable to environmental justice argu-
ments). 
185 See Cole, mpra note 144, at 54l. 
186 See COLE & FOSTER, supra note 61, at 126. 
187 See discussion infra Part III.C. 
188 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
189 U.S. CON ST. amend. XIV, § l. 
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been interpreted to mean that neither the federal nor the state gov-
ernments may deny citizens equal protection under the law. 190 
Whether bringing action against the federal or the state government 
for race-based discrimination, the applicable judicial standards are 
essentially the same.191 
Two landmark decisions have defined the rough contours of the 
equal protection doctrine as applied to environmental discrimination. 
In Washington v. Davis, the Supreme Court held that in order to find 
an equal protection violation, minority plaintiffs must establish more 
than discriminatory impact on their communities as a result of the 
law.192 The Court requires proof of invidious discrimination-dis-
criminatory intent.193 The following year, the Court reaffirmed the 
need to prove intentional discrimination in race-based equal protec-
tion cases in Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Develop-
ment C01P.194 Generally, such proof may be based on circumstantial or 
direct evidence of an intent to discriminate. 195 Cases citing dispropor-
tionate impacts among minorities will only surpass this heightened 
standard when such impacts are "unexplainable on grounds other 
than race."196 These instances are rare. 197 The combined effect of the 
Washington and Arlington Heights rulings is that equal protection plain-
tiffs must prove discriminatory intent-the elusive smoking gun-or 
be denied a remedy under the doctrine.19B This is a formidable chal-
lenge because only overt acts of discrimination will suffice. 
2. Equal Protection and Environmental Justice 
Three major environmental justice cases have been tried since 
the decisions in Washington and Arlington Heights, and all three plain-
tiffs lost because they failed to overcome the high "discriminatory in-
190 See Philip Weinberg, Equal Protection, in THE LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAl, JUSTICE, supra 
note 66, at 3. 
191 See id. 
192 426 U.S. 229, 242-44 (1976). 
193 [d. at 240 (holding that "the invidious quality of a law claimed to be racially dis-
criminatory must ultimately be traced to a racially discriminatory purpose"). 
194 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977) ("Proof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose is re-
quired to show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause."). 
195 See id. at 266. 
196 [d. 
197 [d. For an example of the type of evidence needed to overcome this hurdle, see Yick 
Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 374 (1886), where the Supreme Court found that the only 
possible conclusion for the disparate impact shown by the plaintiff was hostility to the 
plaintiff's race. 
198 See Fisher, supra note 161, at 306. 
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tent" hurdle established by the Court.199 The first, Bean v. Southwestern 
Waste Management Corp., concerned the siting of a solid waste landfill 
on the outskirts of Houston, Texas.2oo There, plaintiffs offered statisti-
cal evidence that the majority of such landfills were sited in areas with 
predominantly minority populations.201 The court rejected this argu-
ment, however, concluding that the landfills were placed in these ar-
eas because that is "where Houston's industry is, not because that is 
where Houston's minority population is," and because the data could 
be interpreted differently to reveal almost no disparity in siting 
choices.202 Therefore, the court held that the plaintiffs' showing did 
not satisfY the Washington and Arlington Heights standards.203 
The next decision, East Bibb Twiggs v. Macon Planning & Zoning 
Commission, dealt with a similar situation in which plaintiffs brought 
equal protection claims seeking to enjoin the development of a 
landfill in a largely minority community.204 However, the only other 
landfill in the area was in a predominantly white neighborhood.205 
This fact worked against plaintiffs' disparate impact argument, and 
ultimately the court held that the standards imposed by Washington 
and Arlington Heights were not satisfied.206 
In R.I.S.E., Inc. v. Kay, the court once again decided in favor of 
the defendants on an environmental justice equal protection claim 
brought to prevent a private landfill from being sited in a minority 
area.207 Plaintiffs proffered evidence that the residents in the area sur-
rounding the planned facility were 64% black, and that past facilities 
had been sited in areas with populations ranging from 95 to 100% 
black.208 However, the court rejected these arguments, finding that 
"the Equal Protection Clause does not impose an affirmative duty to 
equalize the impact of official decisions on different racial groups. 
Rather, it merely prohibits government officials from intentionally 
discriminating on the basis of race. "209 
199 SeeJill E. EYans, Challenging the Racism in Envirollmental Racism: Redefining the Concept 
o/Intellt, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 1219, 1280-88 (1998). 
200 482 F. Supp. 673, 677-79 (S.D. Tex. 1979). 
201 See id. at 678-79. 
202 Id. at 679. 
203 See id. at 677. 
204 706 F. Supp. 880, 881-84 (M.D. Ga. 1989), a/I'd, 888 F.2d 1573 (11th Cir. 1989), 
amended by 896 F.2d 1264 (11th Cir. 1989). 
205 Id. at 884. 
206 Id. 
207 768 F. Supp. 1144, 1150 (E.D. Va. 1991), a/I'd, 977 F.2d 573 (4th Cir. 1992). 
208 Id. at 1148. 
209 Id. at 1150. 
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3. As Applied to FERC 
The cases above exemplify the difficulty in proceeding under the 
Equal Protection Clause. Because plaintiffs must demonstrate that the 
government intentionally discriminated against them on the basis of 
race, they will not be able to prevail unless there is overt discrimina-
tion.210 Mere evidence of discriminatory impact will not suffice.2l1 
This poses a problem for potential victims of environmental in-
justice who seek redress from a federal agency such as FERC. For ex-
ample, suppose that FERC is deciding on whether to approve the lo-
cation of a proposed oil pipeline, and has concluded that a route 
traveling through rural, predominantly minority neighborhoods pres-
ents the best option. In order to prevail using the Equal Protection 
Clause, residents would have to provide evidence that FERC's com-
missioners intentionally supported the proposition because the resi-
dents of those communities were minorities.212 Unless the only possi-
ble explanation was that the decision was based upon race, it wouldn't 
matter that the path of the pipeline wove around white neighbor-
hoods and passed straight through minority neighborhoods so long as 
an intent to discriminate could not be shown. 
As several authors have pointed out, the burden of showing in-
tentional discrimination is nearly impossible to overcome, particularly 
in the siting context where FERC's motivations could easily be 
masked.213 Thus, the Equal Protection Clause seems to afford little 
protection for those would-be challengers of a FERC decision that re-
sults in a disparate impact on low-income and minority communi-
210 Cf K.G. Jan Pillai, Neutrality of the Equal Protection Clause, 27 HASTINGS CON ST. L.Q. 
89, 97-98 (1999) (stating that "the Supreme Court has made the task of proving inten-
tional discrimination-in the absence of some so-called 'smoking gun' evidence-ex-
tremely difficult"). 
211 See Weinberg, supra note 190, at 6-7. 
212 See Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977) 
(requiring proof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose to show a violation of the 
Equal Protection Clause). 
213 See, e.g., Sheila Foster, Race(ial) Matters: The Quest for Environmental Justice, 20 ECOL-
OGY L.Q. 721, 729 (1993) ("Often no visible smoking gun exists behind the decision to 
place a toxic facility in a neighborhood composed primarily of racial minorities."); Peter L. 
Reich, Greening the Ghetto: A Theory of Environmental Race Discrimination, 41 U. KAN. L. REV. 
271, 306-12 (1992) (finding that injuries such as disparate waste siting are not usually ac-
companied by evidence of motive); Gerald Torres, Environmental Burdens and Democratic 
Justice, 21 FORDHAM URB. LJ. 431, 442 n.73 (1994) (concluding that "in this day and age, 
few would be so obtuse as to admit, on the record, that he or she made a particular deci-
sion based upon purely racial considerations. There are few 'smoking guns' when it comes 
to racial discrimination. ") . 
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ties. 214 For all intents and purposes, unless the Commission evinces 
discrimination in its decisionmaking process, the Equal Protection 
Clause offers little hope for environmental justice proponents. 
IV. FERC AND ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: Do ENVIRONMENTAL 
STATUTES PROVIDE A BETTER WAY? 
The inescapable conclusion to be drawn from the foregoing dis-
cussion is that FERC is somewhat insulated from environmental jus-
tice challenges, raising the potential for abuse when the Commission 
decides on importan t matters impacting low-income and minority 
communities. The remainder of this Note will question why FERC is 
not obligated to consider environmental justice, and then explore 
how environmental statutes may offer petitioners the best opportunity 
to advance environmental justice arguments against the Commission. 
A. FERC and Environmental Justice 
FERC has only dealt directly with environmental justice on a 
handful of occasions.215 Interestingly, upon initial consideration of the 
issue, FERC seemed willing to abide by the Executive Order on envi-
ronmental justice. In ruling on a 1997 pipeline proposal, the Com-
mission determined that it "complied ... with the directives of Execu-
tive Order No. 12,898, and considered whether [the pipeline] would 
have a disproportionately high and adverse effect on low[-]income or 
minority populations."216 Subsequent decisions, however, were not as 
accommodating; finding that Executive Order No. 12,898 "does not 
apply to independent agencies, such as the Commission."217 This dis-
crepancy suggests that FERC made an active decision not to take envi-
ronmen tal justice in to account. 
Occasionally, however, after determining that it is not bound to 
consider environmental justice principles, FERC will still take the time 
to respond to environmental justice concerns.218 The problem is that 
214 [d. 
215 An advanced search of FERC's online database of administrative decisions revealed 
only a limited treatment of the issue. See ABOUT FERC, supra note 103 (last searched Mar. 
14,2002). 
216 Maritimes & Northeast Pipeline, L.L.C., 81 F.E.R.C. 'l[ 61,166 (1997), 1997 ,\NL 
812154, at *13. 
217 City of Tacoma, Washington, 86 F.E.R.C. 'l[ 61,311 (1999), 1999 vVL 177637, at *2-3. 
218 See, e.g., Millennium Pipeline Co., 97 F.E.R.C. 'l[ 61,292 (2001) (interinl order), 
2001 WL 1631910, at *46. 
382 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 30:353 
such concerns are often summarily dismissed with little discussion of 
how a FERC decision might disproportionately impact low-income 
and minority populations.219 Often no reference is made to census 
figures for the affected areas, or whether these communities are al-
ready subject to significant environmental burdens.22o The implica-
tion is that FERC is reluctant to explore the issue in any degree of de-
tail. Several factors, however, suggest that FERC should pay closer 
attention to these claims. 
1. Independence as a Shield 
As noted above, FERC commonly cites its independent status as a 
reason for not considering Executive Order No. 12,898 in its deci-
sionmaking process. 221 But FERC was granted independence because 
of its involvement in power trading, not because of its role in hydro-
power licensing and pipeline construction-two areas where envi-
ronmental justice considerations come into play.222 Therefore, FERC 
should not be allowed to hide behind its independence when address-
ing the effects of its actions on minority and low-income communities. 
Furthermore, the line between independent and federal agencies 
has faded over time. As one court commented, it is questionable 
whether "the decisions of such agencies so clearly involve scientific 
judgment rather than political choice that it is even theoretically de-
sirable to insulate them from the democratic process. "223 Moreover, 
legal scholars, the Justice Department, and the Supreme Court alike 
have echoed these concerns.224 Such questioning casts further doubt 
on FERC's practice of relying on its independence as a basis for disre-
garding environmen tal justice. 225 
219 See id. (including only four paragraphs of discussion on environmental justice out 
of 199 total pages). 
220 See, e.g., Georgia Power Co., 98 F.E.R.C.' 61,105 (2002),2002 WL 127090, at *4. 
221 See supra Part II.B. 
222 Department of Energy Organization Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7171 (a) (2000); see discussion 
supra note 115. 
223 Synar v. United States, 626 F. Supp. 1374, 1398 (D.D.C. 1986), afi'd on other grounds 
sub nom. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986). 
224 See A. Michael Froomkin, In Defense of Administrative Agency Autonomy, 96 YALE LJ. 
787,787-89 (1987). 
225 See id. 
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2. Comparison with Other Agencies 
There are sixteen independent agencies, such as FERC, currently 
operating within the federal government.226 How have these other 
agencies responded in the wake of the environmental justice move-
ment and Executive Order No. 12,898? Few of them would have cause 
for considering environmental justice principles, as their regulatory 
agendas revolve around finance or labor issues. But at least one 
agency, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), has considered 
the issue.227 The difference between FERC's and NRC's responses to 
environmen tal justice concerns is striking. 
NRC has taken a completely different tack on environmen tal j llS-
tice. 228 Just one month after President Clinton issued the Executive 
Order on environmental justice, NRC declared its intention to en-
force the Order internally.229 Later, NRC voluntarily joined the Inter-
agency Working Group created by the Order, and drafted its own 
comprehensive environmental justice strategy.230 In light of these ef-
forts, three judges for the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board held 
that NRC was in fact obligated to enforce the Executive Order, notwith-
standing its independence from the Executive Branch.231 
Despite the fact that compliance with the Order was voluntary, 
NRC wholeheartedly adopted environmental justice principles into its 
decisionmaking processes.232 Presumably, NRC recognized the impact 
that its decisions might have on poor and minority communities, and 
took immediate action to protect against potential unfairness.233 
While NRC's support of Executive Order No. 12,898 suggests that 
there are no tangible impediments to FERC embracing environ-
mental justice, FERC decided against it, choosing instead to preserve 
226 See 44 U.S.c. § 3502(5) (2001) (repealed 2002). Independent agencies include the 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission, the Consumer Product Safety Commission, the Federal Communications 
Commission, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Federal Housing Finance 
Board, the Federal Maritime Commission, the Federal Trade Commission, the Interstate 
Commerce Commission, the Mine Enforcement Safety and Health Review Commission, 
the National Labor Relations Board, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Review Commission, the Postal Rate Commission, and the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission. Id. 
227 See generally In re La. Energy Servs., L.P., 45 N.R.C. 367 (1997). 
228Id. 
229 Id. at 385. 
230Id. 
231 Id. at 381-87. 
232 See id. 
233 See La. Energy Servs., 45 N.R.C. at 381-87. 
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its autonomy. More importantly, NRC's contrasting position calls into 
question FERC's motive in refusing to adopt a policy based on social 
equality and fairness. 
Another contrast can be seen in comparing FERC's stance on 
environmental justice to its parent agency, the Department of Energy 
(DOE). As previously noted, DOE has pledged to incorporate envi-
ronmental justice into its decision making process in an effort to be-
come a world leader in environmental technology development and 
application.234 Shouldn't DOE, as an agency with such a firm com-
mitment to environmental justice, begin its enforcement efforts by 
first ensuring that all agencies under its wing are, at a minimum, ac-
tively monitoring their decisions for environmental justice issues? 
Shouldn't FERC seek to further reasonable policy goals of its parent 
agency? The fact that FERC does not even have an environmental jus-
tice policy, while its parent agency has pledged to be a leader in the 
area, calls into question the reasons for FERC's unwillingness to ex-
amine the effect of its decisions on poor and minority communities. 
3. The Effect ofFERC's Failure: Mount Vernon 
The people of Mount Vernon, New York have been severely af-
fected by FERe's refusal to actively consider environmental justice in 
its decisionmaking process.235 There, residents and community lead-
ers, including Senator Hillary Clinton, have banded together to pro-
test against a FERC siting decision on environmental justice 
grounds.236 The challenge concerns a 424-mile pipeline slated to run 
from Canada to Mount Vernon.237 Millennium Pipeline Company, a 
partnership composed of four energy conglomerates, proposed the 
project in December of 1997 to supply energy to the expanding New 
York City market.238 Amidst strong opposition,239 FERC approved the 
project in December of 200l.240 
234 See supra Part III. 
235 See Under Pressure from Hillary Clinton and Others, FERC Schedules September 4 Meeting in 
Mount VeTnon, New York on Millennium Pipeline, FOSTER NAT. GAS REP., Aug. 16,2001, at 11 
[hereinafter Under Pressure], available at 2001 WL 7697383. 
236 [d. 
237 See Millennium Pipeline Co., 97 F.E.R.C. '161,292 (2001) (interim order), 2001 WL 
1631910, at *2. 
238 [d. 
239 See Under Pressure, supra note 235, at 11. 
240 See generally Millennium Pipeline, 97 F.E.R.C. '161,292, 2001 WL 1631910. 
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Mount Vernon is a community composed of over 70% minority 
residents. 241 In the areas closest to construction, however, this number 
jumps to more than 85%.242 Opponents of the pipeline have charged 
that Mount Vernon's more affluent neighbors received better treat-
ment when dealing with FERC,243 that the pipeline need not go 
through Mount Vernon at all,244 and that the proposed site runs too 
close to local schools, churches, hospitals, and playgrounds.245 Addi-
tionally, the project has raised health concerns, including the risk of 
explosion,246 and the threat that construction will unearth dioxin, a 
carcinogenic chemical used legally in the area during the 1960s and 
1970s.247 
Currently, the City of Mount Vernon is protesting FERC's deci-
sion.248 In addition to other factors, the City points out that although 
only 3.1 miles of the 424-mile pipeline require street construction, 
61 % of this construction goes through Mount Vernon.249 As Michael 
Zarin, counsel for the City, questioned, would this be acceptable in a 
wealthy neighboring community like Scarsdale?250 
In light of the face-off in Mount Vernon, the question necessarily 
moves from whether FERC should be taking environmen tal justice in to 
account to the larger question of whether it must. The remainder of 
this Note examines how environmental statutes may bt' employed by 
people, in Mount Vernon and elsewhere, to compel FERC to consider 
environ men tal justice in its decision making process. 
B. Environmental Justice Under Statutory Allth01ity 
Partly in response to the difficulties encountered when challeng-
ing an agency's decision under Executive Order No. 12,898, Title VI 
of the Civil Rights Act, and the Equal Protection Clause, several com-
241 See id. at *46. 
242 See Under Pressure, supra note 235, at II. 
243 Id. Initially, even Senator Clinton's request for an additional public hearing on the 
project was denied by FERC. Id. 
244 See Millennium Meets New Struggle in Charge of Environmental Racism, NAT. GAS. WK., 
Jan. 14, 2002, at PI [hereinafter Millennium Meets New Struggle], available at 2002 WL 
8297039. 
245 See Under Pressure, supra note 235, at 11. 
246 See Millennium Meets New Struggle, supra note 244, at PI. 
247 See Kate Stone Lombardi, Under Whose Backyard?, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2002, § 14WC. 
248 See Motion of the City of Mount Vernon for Rehearing of the Interim Order and for 
Reopening of the Record on the Proposed Millennium Pipeline Project at 6, Millennium 
Pipeline Co., 97 F.E.R.C. 'l[ 61,292 (2001) (No. CP98-150-003). 
249 Id. 
250 Telephone Intef\'iewwith Michael Zarin, Zarin & Steinmetz (Mar. 14,2002). 
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mentators began emphasizing the importance of general environ-
mental statutes in pursuing environmental justice claims.251 These 
statutes can be a powerful tool for advocates252 and agencies253 alike in 
challenging disparate environmental impacts on those often least 
equipped-politically or financially-to respond to environmental 
threats. 
1. The Traditionalist Approach 
Perhaps the most basic reason for seeking redress under a statu-
tory scheme can be seen in the "traditionalist" approach. The tradi-
tionalist seeks to remedy environmental injustices through conven-
tional environmental law.254 This approach begins with the premise 
that environmental statutes were created to protect all people. There-
fore, environmental justice advocates can avoid the complexities in-
herent in framing their argument around civil rights law, and instead 
look to basic environmental law. 255 In short, environmental justice 
without the justice: using an environmental statute to correct enVl-
ronmentaljustice problems without reference to race or class.256 
251 E.g., Cole, supra note 144, at 526 (ranking environmental statutes ahead of civil 
rights and constitutional challenges as the best vehicles for pursuing environmental justice 
claims); Sheila R. Foster, Meeting the Environmental justice Challenge: Evolving Norms in Envi-
ronmental Decision Making, [2000 News & Analysis] 30 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envt!. L. Inst.) 10,992, 
10,994 (Nov. 2000) (discussing the problems with civil rights challenges in the environ-
mental justice context, and claiming that "the most successful legal challenges are based 
on environmental law"); Torres, supra note 213, at 437 (stating that environmental justice 
claims under statute have enjoyed more success than anti-discrimination causes of action); 
see also Barry E. Hill & Nicholas Targ, The Link Between Protecting Natural Resources and The 
Issue of Environmentaljustice, 28 B.C. ENVTL. MF. L. REV. 1,36-37 (2000) (discussing envi-
ronmental justice principles embedded within environmental statutes); Nicholas Targ, 
Environmental justice Issues Under Existing Statutory Authority, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 529, 
538-39 (A.L.L-A.B.A. COURSE OF STUDY, Feb. 7, 2001) (noting that existing environmental 
law provides many opportunities for advancement of environmental justice) [hereinafter 
Targ, Environmentaljustice Issues], available in Westlaw, SF56 ALI-ABA 529. 
252 See Cole, supra note 144, at 527 ("Environmental law challenges in the context of 
environ men tal justice struggles have a proven track record of success."). 
253 See Targ, Envirollmentaljustice Issues, supra note 251, at 531-32 (discussing the ability 
of EPA to address environ men tal justice concerns under statutory authority). 
254 See Cole, supra note 144, at 528. The author, a prolific environmental justice com-
mentator, concludes that traditional environmental law is perhaps the most valuable tool 
for proponents of environmental justice. See id. at 526-28. "Th[e] nuts-and-bolts knowl-
edge of arcane statutes is the least sexy part of environmental justice law, to be sure, but 
perhaps the most importan t." Id. at 528. 
255 Id. at 526-28. 
256 See Torres, supra note 213, at 437. 
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Under this traditionalist approach, activists also enjoy the benefit 
of familiarity. Judges, agencies, and other decision makers generally 
have a fair understanding of environmental statutes, and may have 
less difficulty basing their decision on a statutory discrepancy rather 
than an amorphous concept of equal protection.257 
2. Public Participation 
Another reason for increasing reliance on environmental statutes 
is that many of these statutes provide opportunities for the public to 
participate in agency decisionmaking.258 This is accomplished 
through public participation provisions mandating that agencies 
communicate with those affected by their decisions.259 These provi-
sions allow environmental justice advocates to provide feedback to an 
agency before it issues its final decision on a matter, enabling their 
concerns to be addressed at the front-end of agency decisionmak-
ing.260 
Although public participation requirements are procedural in 
nature, they do have the potential to produce a substantive effect.261 
Recently, environmental justice advocates in Louisiana were successful 
in petitioning EPA, under the Clean Air Act, to deny a permit for a 
large chemical facility.262 In addition, if an agency fails to abide by the 
participation requirements in reaching a decision, courts may invali-
date the decision. 263 Because of these and other benefits, some envi-
ronmental justice scholars have suggested that activists take a closer 
look at participation requirements when defending against environ-
mental injustice.264 
257 See discussion supra Parts III.B, .C. 
258 See Sheila Foster, Public Participation, in THE LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE, supra 
note 66, at 185. 
259 See id. 
260 See id. at 185·-86. 
261 See id. at 185-89. 
262 See Robert R. Kuehn, Denying Access to Legal Representation: The Attack on the Tulane 
Environmental Law Clinic, 4 WASH. U. J.L. & POI:y 33, 48-50 (2000). Kuehn details how 
EPA granted, for the first time, a citizens petition filed under the Clean Air Act. See id. at 
50. 
263 See, e.g., EI Pueblo Para eI Aire y Agua Limpio v. County of Kings, [1992] 22 Emtl. 
L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,357, 20,358 (Cal. Sup. Dec. 30, 1991) (finding a permitting 
decision regarding a hazardous waste incinerator to be invalid, in part, because authorities 
failed to include the predominantly Latino community in the decision making process). 
264 See generally Luke W. Cole, Macho Law Brains, Public Citizens, and Grassroots Activists: 
Three Models of Environmental Advocacy, 14 VA. ENVTL. LJ. 687 (1995) (discussing the 
benefits of statutory public participation requirements in the environmental justice con-
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3. Bridging the Gap Between Environmental Law and Environmental 
Justice 
It is doubtful, however, that basic environmental statutes alone 
could correct the disparity that exists between race, class, and the in-
cidence of environmental hazards.265 Environmental laws themselves 
are sterile and fail to account for institutional and overt racism in 
agency decisionmaking.266 Specifically, something is needed to bridge 
the gap between environmental law and environmental justice. 
For now, that bridge is found in the specific powers conferred to 
federal agencies via environmental statutes. In 1994, President 
Clinton issued a separate memorandum in conjunction with Execu-
tive Order No. 12,898, calling for increased reliance on environ-
mental statutes in an effort to promote environmental justice.267 The 
memorandum stated: 
The purpose of this separate memorandum is to underscore 
certain provision [s] of existing law that can help ensure that 
all communities and persons across this Nation live in a safe 
and healthful environment. Environmental ... statutes pro-
vide many opportunities to address environmental hazards 
in minority communities and low-income communities. Ap-
plication of these existing statutory provisions is an impor-
tant part of this Administration's efforts to prevent those 
minority communities and low-income communities from 
being subject to disproportionately high and adverse envi-
ronmen tal effects. 268 
Further, the memorandum identified specific provisions within the 
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and the Clean Air Act 
(CAA) that would enable a more detailed environmental justice re-
view to take place.269 As a result, administrators and activists alike were 
text); Eileen Gauna, The Environmental Justice Misfit: Public Participation and the Paradig-m 
Paradox, 17 STAN. ENVTL. LJ. 3 (1998) (same). 
265 See Lazarus, supra note 26, at 856-57. 
266 See Torres, supra note 213, at 450. Torres states that "few statutes-state or federal-
require agency officials to consider the racial or distributional effects of an environmental 
decision or action. Therefore ... a claim that relies upon a traditional environmental stat-
ute often does not necessarily affect the ... process through which environmental benefits 
and burdens are distributed.' [d. 
267 President's Memorandum on EnvironmentalJustice, 30 WEEKLY COMPo PRES. Doc. 
279 (Feb. 11, 1994). 
268 [d. 
269 See id. 
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given a statutory roadmap to follow in pursuit of environmental jus-
tice. The following discussion will analyze the specific statutory provi-
sions that administrators and activists may advance in order to compel 
FERC to implement environmental justice into its decision making 
process. 
C. Do NEPA and CAA Provide Environmental Justice Claimants With a 
Remedy? 
For those battling FERC in Mount Vernon and elsewhere, the 
statutory provisions of NEPA and CAA highlighted in President 
Clinton's memorandum on environmental justice may contain means 
for compelling the Commission to incorporate environmental justice 
into its decisionmaking process. Several of NEPA's provisions support 
environmental justice principles, and may be used to pressure FERC 
to consider the effects of its decisions on minority and low-income 
communities.270 Additionally, the CAA may be employed to inject en-
vironmentaljustice issues directly into FERC's evaluation process.271 
l. The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) 
In 1970, NEPA was enacted "[t]o declare a national policy which 
will encourage productive and enjoyable harmony between man and 
his environmen t. "272 Over the years, this broad and wistful language 
has been used to induce agencies to "stop-and-think" before launch-
ing projects that may harm the environment,273 and to compel agen-
cies to disclose information to the public before embarking on a 
specific course of action.274 The vehicle used to accomplish these twin 
aims is the Environmental Impact Statement (EIS).275 An EIS must be 
completed for every major federal action significantly affecting the 
quality of the human environment.276 The EIS requires an agency to 
consider, among other things, "the environmental impact of the pro-
posed action, "277 and "alternatives to the proposed action. "278 Once 
completed, NEPA's administrating agency, the Council on Environ-
270 See infra Part IV.C.2. 
271 See infra Part IV.C.4. 
272 National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 § 2, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (2000). 
273 See PLATER ET AL., supra note 120, at 611. 
2741d. 
2751d. 
276 See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (C). 
2771d. § 4332(2)(C) (i). 
2781d. § 4332(2) (C) (iii). 
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mental Quality (CEQ), requires that an EIS be available to the public 
and any other federal agency with particular expertise regarding the 
proposa1.279 
Despite its vibrant prose, the statute creates no substantive duties 
for agencies to follow. 280 Instead, NEPA is merely a procedural 
mechanism for agencies to follow when considering proposals that 
would have significant environmental effects.281 Agencies are only re-
quired to take a "hard look" at the environmental consequences that 
follow from their approval of major projects.282 Although there is no 
citizen suit provision found within NEPA, courts have upheld lawsuits 
for violations of the Act's procedural obligations.283 
There is some question as to whether NEPA's requirements apply 
to independent agencies such as FERC. Under the guidelines estab-
lished by CEQ, NEPA applies to "all Federal agencies. "284 CEQ defines 
federal agencies as "all agencies of the Federal Government,"285 but 
the language does not explicitly refer to independent agencies.286 The 
Supreme Court has not specifically addressed this question,287 but 
lower courts have held that CEQ regulations do apply to independent 
agencies.288 More importantly, because FERC has promised to comply 
with both NEPA and CEQ's regulations, the issue may be settled.289 
279 See 40 C.F.R. § 1502.19 (2002). 
280 See PLATER ET AL., supra note 120, app. at 57. 
281 See Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 97 
(1983). 
282 See id. at 97. 
283 See PLATER ET AL., supra note 120, app. at 57. 
284 40 C.F.R. § 1500.3 (2002). 
285 40 C.F.R. § 1508.12 (2002). 
286 Cf The National Historic Preservation Act, 16 U.S.C. § 470f (2002) (demonstrating 
that independent agencies have been expressly included in some other provisions). The 
provision reads: 
The head of any Federal agency having direct or indirect jurisdiction over a 
proposed Federal or federally assisted undertaking in any State and the head 
of any Federal department 01' independent agency having authority to license any 
undertaking shall ... take into account the effect of the undertaking on any 
district, site, building, structure, or object that is included in or eligible for 
inclnsion in the National Register. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
287 See Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 99 n.12 
(1983). The Court clarified the scope of its decision: "[W]e do not decide whether [CEQ's 
NEPA regulations] have binding effect on an independent agency." Id. 
288 See, e.g., Sierra Club v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 862 F.2d 222, 229 
(9th Cir. 1989); Steamboaters v. FERC, 759 F.2d 1382, 1393 n.4 (9th Cir. 1985). 
289 See 18 C.F.R. § 380.1-.3 (2002). 
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2. EnvironmentalJustice Analysis Under NEPA 
In regards to NEPA, President Clinton's memorandum declares: 
Each Federal agency shall analyze the environmental ef-
fects, including human health, economic and social effects, 
of Federal actions, including effects on minority communi-
ties and low-income communities, when such analysis is re-
quired by [NEPAl. Mitigation measures outlined or analyzed 
in an environmental assessment, environmental impact 
statement, or record of decision, whenever feasible, should 
address significant and adverse environmental effects of 
proposed Federal actions on minority communities and low-
income communities. 
Each Federal agency shall provide opportunities for com-
munity input in the NEPA process, including identifying po-
tential effects and mitigation measures in consultation with 
affected communities and improving the accessibility of 
meetings, crucial documents, and notices.290 
Thus, the memorandum advocates utilizing NEPA in furtherance of 
two main objectives: (1) analyzing the effect of environmental deci-
sions on minority and low-income communities and (2) increasing 
the opportunities for these communities to participate in the deci-
sionmaking process.291 
In light of these goals, CEQ issued its own guidance "to further 
assist Federal agencies with their NEPA procedures so that environ-
mental justice concerns are effectively identified and addressed."292 
Although noting that there is no "standard formula for how environ-
mental justice issues should be identified and addressed,"293 the guid-
ance points to several principles that may assist agencies in evaluating 
environ men tal justice claims.294 
290 President's Memorandum on Environmental Justice, 30 WEEKLY COMPo PRES. Doc. 
279 (Feb. 11, 1994). 
291 See id. 
292 COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE, GUIDANCE UNDER THE 
NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT 1 (1997) [hereinafter CEQ GUIDANCE], at http:// 
ceq.eh.doe.gov/nepa/regs/ejljustice.pdf (last visited Nov. 18, 2002). This guidance does 
not create any judicially enforceable right. Id. at 23. 
293 See id. at 8. 
294 See id. at 9. The principles are: (1) area composition; (2) public health data; (3) 
cultural and economic factors; (4) public participation; (5) community representation; 
and (6) tribal representation. [d. 
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Specifically, an agency submitting an EIS must consider the "aes-
thetic, historic, cultural, economic, social, or health"295 effects of its 
action, ''whether direct, indirect, or cumulative. "296 As the CEQ report 
notes, environmental justice concerns fall squarely within the ambit of 
this language.297 Furthermore, the "cumulative" effects language has 
been interpreted to mean that the preparing agency must consider 
the "additional effects contributed by actions unrelated to the pro-
posed action .... "298 Thus, agencies must be aware of environmental 
harms accumulating on already overburdened communities. 
Because FERC has pledged to comply with NEPA and CEQ's 
regulations implementing the statute, activists and others may argue 
that any failure by the Commission to consider a proposal's impact on 
minority and low-income communities constitutes a violation of 
NEPA's requirement that agencies examine the cultural, economic, 
and social effects of major federal projects. Courts have found similar 
violations in the past, and have issued preliminary injunctions for 
failure to conform to NEPA's guidelines.299 In addition, administrative 
tribunals have found NEPA violations for failure to consider socio-
economic concerns.300 Thus, environmental justice activists able to 
establish that FERC did not consider the effect of an agency decision 
on a minority or low-income community may be able to argue that 
this failure has resulted in a violation of NEPA, and thereby secure an 
injunction until such impacts are adequately addressed. 
3. The Clean Air Act 
The CAA, which was enacted in 1963301 and incorporated a tech-
nology-forcing strategy after it was extensively amended in 1970,302 
295 40 C.F.R. § 1508.8 (2002); see also id. § 1508.14. 
296Id. § 1508.8. 
297 See CEQ GUIDANCE, supra note 292, at 8. 
298 COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, CONSIDERING CUMULATIVE EFFECTS UNDER THE NA-
TIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT, 2, 8 tbl.l-2 (1997) at http://ceq.eh.doe.gov/nepa/ 
ccenepa/secl.pdf (last visited Nov. 9, 2002). 
299 See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Marsh, 714 F. Supp. 539, 559, 582 (D. Me. 1989), amended by 
744 F. Supp.352 (D. Me. 1989), a/I'd, 976 F.2d 763 (lst Cir. 1992); Colo. River Indian 
Tribes v. Marsh, 605 F. Supp. 1425, 1441 (C.D. Cal. 1985). 
300 See, e.g., In re La. Energy Servs., 47 N .R.C. 77 (1988); S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 
150 I.B.L.A. 158 (1999). 
301 Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (2000). 
302 Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1675 (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7407-7414, 7525, 7541, 7571-7574, 7603-7609, 7641-7642 
(2000)). 
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1977,303 and 1990,304 was established to combat the dangers posed by 
air pollution from urbanization, industrialization, and motor vehi-
cles.305 Its purpose was, in part, "to protect and enhance the quality of 
the Nation's air resources so as to promote the public health and wel-
fare and the productive capacity of its population. "306 The CAA estab-
lished National Ambient Air Quality Standards for both mobile and 
stationary sources of pollution as the primary vehicle for achieving 
this goal,307 Through these standards the government sought to re-
duce the harm inflicted by air pollution, and to encourage techno-
logical advances capable of reducing or eliminating emissions alto-
gether.308 
4. Environmental Justice Analysis Under CAA 
CAA was also singled out in President Clinton's memorandum on 
environmentaljustice.309 The President proclaimed: 
The Environmental Protection Agency, when reviewing envi-
ronmental effects of proposed action of other Federal agen-
cies under section 309 of the Clean Air Act, 42 U .S.C. sec-
tion 7609, shall ensure that the involved agency has fully 
analyzed environmental effects on minority communities 
and low-income communities, including human health, so-
cial, and economic effects.310 
Thus, EPA is entrusted, by statute, with the responsibility of reviewing 
the environmental effects of other agency proposals. This power of 
review stands as an additional means to inject environmental justice 
into FERC decisions. 
Specifically, section 309 of CAA requires EPA to review and com-
ment, in writing, on the environmental impacts of "newly authorized 
303 Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685, amended fry 
Pub. L. No. 95-190 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4362, 7419-7428, 7470-7479, 
7491,7501-7508,7548-7551,7616-7626 (2000». 
304 Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399 (codified 
as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7429-7431,7492, 7505a, 7506a, 7509-7515, 7552-7554, 7581-
7590,7651,7661,7671 (2000». 
305 See 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (a)(2). 
306Id. § 7401(b)(1). 
307 See PLATER ET AL., supra note 120, at 441-49. 
308 Id. 
309 See President's Memorandum on Environmental Justice, 30 WEEKLY CaMP. PRES. 
Doc. 279 (Feb. 11, 1994). 
310 Id. 
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Federal projects for construction and any major Federal agency ac-
tion" to which 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (C) applies.31l Section 4332(2) (C) 
is the provision of NEPA that mandates an EIS be created for all ma-
jor federal projects.312 Consequently, this language requires EPA "to 
comment in writing upon the environmental impacts associated with 
certain proposed actions of other federal agencies, including actions 
subject to NEPA's EIS requirement. "313 Although somewhat counter 
iutuitive, this means EPA-under the authority of an air pollution 
statute-has a say in major projects not necessarily involving air pollu-
tion. 
In addition, section 309 of CAA provides that if the EPA Adminis-
trator finds any proposal to be "unsatisfactory from the standpoint of 
public health or welfare or environmental quality, he shall publish his 
determination and the matter shall be referred to the [CEQ)."314 This 
referral power, however, should only be invoked after EPA has at-
tempted to resolve its concerns with the offending agency.315 
Therefore, EPA has the ability, through CAA, to inject its pro-
environmental justice perspective into projects pursued by other fed-
eral agencies. This ability involves two components: (1) the power to 
review; and (2) the power to refer to CEQ.316 Together, these powers 
provide a great opportunity to advance environmental justice issues.317 
EPA has promulgated its own guidance for consideration of environ-
men tal justice issues under section 309 of CAA:318 
EPA is responsible for developing informed comments and 
recommendations that notify the public and action agency 
of potential oversights in the identification and evaluation of 
potential impacts. EPA determines whether the action 
agency analyzed data on the potential impacts of the pro-
posed action on the environment and human health and 
3l\ Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7609(a) (2000). 
312 See National Environmental Policy Act ofl969, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (C) (2000). 
313 OFFICE OF FED. ACTIVITIES, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, PUB. No. 2252A, FINAL 
GUIDANCE FOR CONSIDERATION m" ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE IN CLEAN AIR ACT 309 RE-
VIEWS § 2.1, at 10 (july 1999) [hereinafter EPA GUIDANCE], at 
http://www.epa.gov / compliance/ resources/ policies/ nepal enviroJustice_309review.pdf. 
3\4 42 U.S.C. § 7609(b). 
315 40 C.F.R. § 1504.2 (2002). 
316 See ENVTL. L. INST., OPPORTUNITIES FOR ADVANCING ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: AN 
ANALYSIS OF U.S. EPA STATUTORY AUTHORITIES 81 (Nov. 2001). 
317 See id. 
318 See generally EPA GUIDANCE, supra note 313. Like the NEPA guidance, this guidance 
does not create any judicially enforceable right. [d. at 1 (disclaimer). 
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whether a reasonable effort was made to inform and involve 
the public in the EIS development process.319 
395 
More specifically, the guidance states, "All EISs filed with EPA should 
be reviewed for adequate environmental justice content."320 There-
fore, EPA is obligated to inject environmental justice principles into 
every major federal action requiring an EIS under NEPA. 
EPA developed a ratings system to assist in this endeavor.321 Un-
der this system, EPA employs an eight-step process that outlines how 
to identifY potential negative environmental impacts on minority and 
low-income populations.322 It also establishes procedures for public 
involvement where there are disproportionately high and adverse im-
pacts on the affected community.323 This system is employed when 
minority and low-income communities are present in an area affected 
by a proposal and disproportionate impacts may result.324 Similarly, 
when considering the adequacy of a proposal, EPA should consider 
whether a sufficient amount of information was supplied in the EIS, 
and whether the statement adequately addresses any resulting im-
pacts.325 
The result of this system is that EPA has the power to review every 
FERC decision requiring an EIS for proper observance of environ-
men tal justice principles. Should EPA find FERC' s environmen tal jus-
tice review to be substandard, it could then publish its own findings 
and attempt to correct any deficiencies through direct negotiations 
with the Commission.326 Should these efforts fail, EPA has the power 
to refer the matter to CEQ for final determination.327 
Once a decision has been referred to CEQ, the waters get con-
siderably murkier. The question becomes whether CEQ can overturn 
FERC approval of a project for failure to adequately address environ-
mental justice concerns? FERC would say, "No." In an order entitled 
Pmmoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-disCliminatory 
Transmission Services by Public Utilities, FERC declined to "participate" 
in an EPA section 309 referral on the grounds that there was not a 
319Id. § 2.1, at 10. 
320 Id. § 2.3, at 11. 
321 Seeid. § 2.4.1-.4.3, at 16. 
322 See id. § 3, at 16-22. 
323Id. 
324 See id. § 2.4.1, at 16. 
325 See EPA GUIDANCE, supra note 313, § 2.4.2, at 16. 
326 Seeid. § 2.4.1-.4.2., at 16. 
327 See id. 
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significant factual basis to justify the action, and that, as an independ-
ent agency, the Commission is not bound by CEQ determinations.328 
FERC did agree, however, to address EPA concerns independently of 
any obligations to do SO.329 
FERC argued that it was required "by law" to make its decisions 
independent of executive authority, and that it was obligated to en-
sure the overall independence of its decisionmaking process.330 Its 
opinion went on to declare that the CEQ process was ''wholly unsuit-
able" for resolving disputes with an independent agency, and that it 
"cannot" be bound by such a process.331 Interestingly, the opinion 
failed to explain FERC's reasoning. 
More importantly, the opinion failed to address the fact that 
FERC had explicitly agreed to abide by CEQ's regulations,332 including 
CEQ's section 309 referral power,333 "except where those regulations are 
inconsistent with the statutory requirements of the Commission."334 
Because CEQ's referral power is itself a statutory requirement,335 this 
qualification would seem not to pose a problem. Thus, it does not ap-
pear that FERC can reasonably remove itself from the section 309 re-
ferral process. 
Mter receiving a referral, CEQ is authorized to do a number of 
things. For instance, CEQ can require additional meetings to be held 
or force agencies to engage in extended negotiations.336 CEQ may 
also submit the matter to the President for "action."337 These powers 
appear to afford CEQ the leverage necessary to require enhanced en-
vironmental justice review of a FERC decision. In light of FERC's re-
fusal to participate in the referral process, it may fall upon the courts 
to enforce CEQ statutory authority. Although there has been almost 
328 Order Responding to Referral to Council on Environmental Quality, 75 F.E.R.C. 




332 See 18 C.F.R. § 380.1 (2002). 
333 See 40 C.F.R. § 1504.1-.3 (2002). 
334 See 18 C.F.R. § 380.1. 
335 See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7609 (2000). 
336 See 40 C.F.R. § 1504.3(f) (3), (5). 
337 See id. § 1504.3(f) (7). 
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no judicial review on this issue,338 what case law there is suggests that 
CEQ's authority under section 309 is considerable.339 
In Sylvester v. United States Army Corps oj Engineers, the court con-
sidered a project that EPA had referred to CEQ pursuant to sec-
tion 309.340 The court found that section 309 referrals place CEQ in 
the position of "arbitrator in disputes between federal agencies on 
environmental issues."341 Furthermore, the court stated that "[t]his is 
not done as an idle exercise. It is to provide guidance to all who may 
be concerned, including courts. "342 Although CEQ had actually 
granted its approval of the project in Sylveste1~ it did so only after the 
defendant had complied with several modifications suggested by 
CEQ.343 Further, the court held that CEQ's approval of the defen-
dant's actions was entitled to judicial deference.344 
Although not directly on point, Sylveste1' supports the assertion 
that CEQ's approval under section 309 is significant,345 and provides 
judicial deference to CEQ's decisions.346 The court's decision suggests 
that if CEQ had failed to approve of the project, the defendants might 
not have faired as well.347 
Similarly, in National Wildlife Fede1'ation v. Goldschmidt, EPA re-
jected the Federal Highway Administration's approval of a highway 
project based on a NEPA violation and referred the matter to CEQ 
under section 309.348 Like EPA, CEQ found the project unacceptable 
on the same grounds,349 and work on the project was halted.35o As in 
Sylveste1', this sequence of events supports the contention that CEQ has 
substantial authority under section 309. 
In summary, it appears that EPA does have power under sec-
tion 309 to reject federal projects and refer the matter to CEQ for fur-
ther inquiry. If problems are not corrected, CEQ's determination may 
338 This relative lack of case law may be due to the fact that many problems are worked 
out in the negotiation process between CEQ. EPA, and the offending agency. 
339 See ge1/erally, e.g., Sylvester v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 884 F.2d 394 (9th 
Cir. 1989); Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Goldschmidt, 677 F.2d 259 (2d Cir. 1982). 
340 884 F.2d 394, 398. 
341 Id. at 399. 
342Id. 
343 Id. at 398. 
344 Id. at 399. 
345Id. 
346 884 F.2d at 399. 
347Id. at 398-99. 
348 See 677 F.2d 259, 261-62 (2d Cir. 1982). 
349 [d. at 262. 
350 See id. 
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well be entitled to judicial deference. As a result, if EPA rejects a 
FERC proposal for failure to adequately consider environmental jus-
tice, it may refer the case to CEQ, which may also reject FERC's deci-
sion and withhold approval. A court may uphold this determination. 
Because both EPA and CEQ have professed to be staunch sup-
porters of environmental justice,351 the threat of a section 309 referral 
may provide environmental justice advocates with the leverage neces-
sary to overturn or significantly improve a FERC decision affecting 
poor and minority communities. 
CONCLUSION 
Since its creation twenty-five years ago, FERC has been hesitant to 
incorporate environmental justice principles into its decisionmaking 
process. When challenged, it has clung to its independent agency 
status as a means of warding off those who seek to invoke the mandate 
of Executive Order No. 12,898. Because it is unlikely that the Com-
mission can be held accountable under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act 
or the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution, an agency like 
FERC has been effectively insulated from environmental justice chal-
lenges. 
But why has FERC not taken it upon itself to establish a compre-
hensive strategy to address these issues? Is it not concerned that its 
decisions may disproportionately impact poor and minority neigh-
borhoods? If it is concerned, should it not seek to align itself with 
agencies like NRC and DOE, strong supporters of environmental jus-
tice that bear close relation to FERC? What is FERC's motive in side-
stepping the issue? 
There are no ready answers to these questions. But one thing is 
clear: FERC should not be permitted to act with impunity when decid-
ing matters affecting poor and minority communities. To ensure that 
FERC incorporates environmental justice concerns into its decision-
making process, agencies and activists should consider using the pro-
visions in NEPA and CAA as a means of redress for environmental in-
justices attendant to any FERC decision. 
351 See supra Parts I.C (EPA). IV.C.2 (CEQ). 
